

Rural Romania within the Political Economy of the Golden Age

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Abstract

The research proposed here investigates the significant transformations of the Romanian countryside -- from communist-forced collectivization to a dramatic program of rural systematization, during the distinctive communist stage ruled by Nicolae Ceausescu, 1965-1989, the so-called golden age. Factor analysis revealed that Ceausescu, who evolved from a leader apparently committed to modernization and liberalization in 1965 to a regressive neo-Stalinist despot by 1989, was the moral author of some radical campaigns with negative consequences on agricultural practice and rural life. It can be concluded that rural Romania was profoundly changed by the communist rule and Soviet domination, agricultural policy functioning as the heavy artillery of the Communist Party against the Romanian peasants.

Keywords: Romania, Ceausescu, golden age, neo-Stalinism, collectivized agriculture, rural life

Introduction

During the first half of the 1960s, the Romanian government established its crucial political goal -- the building of the Romanian socialist state and disengaging from the USSR, all while maintaining Stalinist authoritarianism. The death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965 and the appointment of Nicolae Ceausescu as a leader of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) (*Partidul Communist Roman*, PCR) marked the beginning of a distinctive communist stage, the so-called "golden age" (Fischer-Galati 1998: 462, Cartwright 2001: 89). For almost a quarter of a century, Romania was ruled by an individual who evolved "from a leader apparently committed to modernization and liberalization in 1965 to a regressive neo-Stalinist despot by 1989" (Fischer-Galati 1998: 462). Insatiable for power and adulation, as well as for a cult of personality, Ceausescu became the absolute leader of Romania from November 1974, when the Eleventh Congress of the Romanian Communist Party provided him the dual role of President of the country and General Secretary of the Party. From 1979, Ceausescu's power became absolute. From this position, Ceausescu was the moral author, among other draconian schemes, of the new radical campaign of rural planning, called systematization (*sistematizare*), which was, in fact, the beginning of the destruction of the identity of Romania's traditional villages (Turnock 1991a, Cartwright 2001, Ronnas 1989). This study investigates first the Romanian foreign politics, especially regarding agriculture, emphasizing the new orientation toward the West as a means of expressing Romania's independence from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Then, it analyses the peculiarities of the Romanian socialized agriculture within the centrally planned economy and the impact of collectivization on Romanian society, addressing the consequences of adjusting Romanian agriculture to the Golden Age policies.

Foreign Politics and Agriculture

By 1965 Gheorghiu-Dej's foreign and domestic policies were heading toward "de-Russification" and "autonomy," a very different path compared with the other countries of Eastern Europe (Georgescu 1991: 246-247). In this context, Romania vehemently opposed the economic integration and specialization proposed by the supranational Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), regarding "a division between the industrialized north and the agrarian south" (Georgescu 1991: 245).

More specifically, after 1955, when COMECON was reactivated, the Soviet Union proposed to create “a division of labor and economic specialization” in Eastern Europe (Georgescu 1991: 243, Tismaneanu 2002, Deletant 2004). The Northern socialist countries, especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia, became responsible for industrial development, while the Southern ones, including Romania, had to provide raw materials and agricultural products. This new vision created conflicts between the developed North and the developing South, especially taking into account Bulgaria’s position, which quickly accepted Moscow’s view. In this light, in 1964 the Romanian government rejected the Russian Professor E.B. Valev’s proposal for the creation of an “interstate economic complex in the lower Danube region” (Georgescu 1991: 245, Figure 1) to which, Romania would have had to contribute the entire Southern and South-Eastern part of its territory (100,000 sq. km, 42% of its territory), together with Northern Bulgaria (38,000 sq. km), and the Southern Soviet Union, around the Northern part of the Danube Delta (12,000 sq. km). The major objective of this proposal was clearly to foster agricultural development, wherein Romania was to become the “agricultural hinterland” of communist Europe (Tismaneanu 2002: 48). However, Romania considered the plan “an attempt to dismember national economies and national territory” and rejected it in the name of national interest (Georgescu 1991: 245, Deletant 2004).

Although at home efforts towards economic liberalism were drastically constricted, between 1965 and 1974 Romania’s diplomatic initiatives were quite remarkable, taking into account the political context of Eastern Europe. In this light, of considerable importance was the preferential treatment in trade, granted by the Common Market in 1973, followed by the first trade agreement concluded in 1976 (Georgescu 1991, Fischer-Galati 1998). Also worthy of mention, in addition to the admission of Romania into GATT in 1971, are the negotiations for Romania’s membership in both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), completed in 1972. Furthermore, as the only member of the socialist camp that maintained diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six-Day War (1967), Romania became the first communist country to secure most-favored nation status from the Congress of the United States, in July 1975¹ (Georgescu 1991, Fischer-Galati 1998, Deletant 2004). Moreover, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (1967), as well as Romania’s neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict, its closer ties with Yugoslavia, its refusal not only to support Moscow’s wish for hegemony over the international communist movement but also to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian territory, and its non-participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, seriously tested the limits of Soviet tolerance and brought greater Western recognition. Equally important, several prestigious visitors to Bucharest, such as French President Charles de Gaulle in 1968 and United States President Richard Nixon in 1969, brought goodwill and Western economic aid to Romania. Consequently, foreign trade was gradually reoriented toward the West and, after 1971, a series of Romanian-Western companies were established for industrial and commercial development (Georgescu 1991, Fischer-Galati 1998).

The new orientation toward the West, as a means of expressing Romania’s independence from COMECON, is evident from a quick analysis of the export-import operations of the country. According to Georgescu (1991), the total value of imports from the West rose from 21.5% of all imports in 1958 to 40% in 1965, while exports increased from 24% to 33%. During the same period of time, imports from the Soviet Union decreased from 53% to 38%, while exports declined from 50% to 40%. Overall, in 1965 trade with COMECON accounted for 60% of the value of all Romania’s foreign commerce, of which 39% was with the Soviet Union and 29% with the developed capitalist countries. The situation reversed after a decade, however, and the figures recorded in 1974 show an increase of trade with the developed countries from 29% to 45%, while trade with COMECON countries decreased from 60% of all trade to 34%, of which 16% was with the Soviet Union. Yet, the mismanagement of the economy again reoriented Romania to the East during the 1980s. In this context, Romania’s foreign trade on the less competitive socialist market grew from 34% in 1974 to 57% between 1980 and 1985, in which the most spectacular trade increase, from 16% to 34% between 1982 and 1986, was recorded with the Soviet Union. Consequently, Western developed countries’ share of all trade decreased from 45% in 1974 to an annual average of 27% between 1981 and 1985 (Woolley 1975, Georgescu 1991). After 1965, Romania continued to remain an important producer of grain, especially corn and wheat, but the exports of food products were still low during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Exports of corn, for example, dropped from around 2.3 million tonnes in 1967 to only 373,000 tonnes in 1970, followed by a relatively slow increase in 1972 to 900,000 tonnes (International Historical Statistics, Europe 2003). Analyzing Romania’s external trade, Georgescu (1991) correlated the low and/or moderate export of food production with the existence of abundant food in Romania during the seventies.

¹ Romania lost most-favored nation status in 1988 (Georgescu 1991: 275).

Yet, by 1979 both Romania's economy and international relations with the Western countries, particularly with the United States and France, had evidently deteriorated as a result of the flagrant violation of human rights in Romania. In addition, the termination of the established relationships with the Shah resulted in higher prices for Iranian oil and, therefore, a higher dependency on Soviet oil (Fischer-Galati 1998). The increasingly critical economic and cultural situation in Romania was followed by strong individual dissatisfaction. As a result, after 1975 two significant phenomena started to emerge: growing dissidence and emigration (Georgescu 1991, Turnock 1997, Deletant 1999). The most active dissident movement was the religious one, most notably that of the Orthodox Church, especially between 1975 and 1983. As for emigration, it is worth pointing out that much of this had an ethnic dimension, with Germans and Jews being some of the first emigrants, followed by Hungarians, Armenians, Greeks, and other Romanian ethnic minorities, as well as many Romanians, who were eager to leave the country. According to Georgescu (1991), between 1975 and 1986 some 170,000 Romanian urban and rural citizens left the country, with the result that some ethnic rural communities were drastically diminished.

Part of the reason for the emigration is that Ceausescu, in order to secure hard currency from the West, especially from Germany and Israel, encouraged the emigration of Germans and Jews, requiring them in 1982 to pay for their freedom with the equivalent of the cost of their education received in Romania, the so-called "emigration tax"² or "head tax" (Georgescu 1991, Fischer-Galati 1998: 472, Deletant 1999: 110). Under the agreement between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany, approximately 12,000 ethnic Germans annually received permission to leave the country, with Germany paying approximately DM 8,000 for each. As usual, the communist state did not pay any compensation to the emigrants for their houses and agricultural and/or forest land, which remained in the country. In this context, Romania, especially Transylvania's and Banat's villages, lost thousands of disciplined and skilled German workers, together with their unique cultural identities. At the same time, Romanians and other ethnic groups were increasingly isolated from the outside world.

Although Romanian-Soviet political relations showed some improvements after 1974, the economic relations between Romania and COMECON returned to their 1964 positions when COMECON once again repeated the call for economic specialization and integration among member nations, the proposal previously rejected by Romania. However, having become more discredited in the West after 1980, Ceausescu increasingly focused his economic interest on the Soviet Union, signing in May 1986 a document with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev regarding a "long-term program for the development of Romanian-Soviet economic, technological and scientific cooperation" (Georgescu 1991: 271). Furthermore, Romania decided to develop "direct links" between Romanian and Soviet enterprises, a decision which had been totally unacceptable in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s (ibid). This shift was explained by Georgescu (1991: 271) as a result of the "colossal mismanagement of the economy and by the incapacity of the ruling class to respond to the need of reforms." Moreover, after March 1985, when Gorbachev came to power, Ceausescu not only rejected any suggestion for liberalization in Romania but also was the most vocal opponent of reform in the Soviet bloc, raising the level of repression against his critics (Fischer-Galati 1998, Deletant 1999 & 2004).

Consequently, from being considered "one of eastern Europe's good Communists," in the words of George Bush³, or his being treated as "a courageous and innovative leader" in his visits to Buckingham Palace and the White House, Ceausescu's image dramatically changed in the eye of the Western media (Georgescu 1991: 267-268). Given his failure to develop a more liberal domestic model of society and as a result of his economic mismanagement impoverishing one of the richest East European countries, Ceausescu was increasingly characterized as a "tyrant" (The Wall Street Journal) or "the sick man of communism" (The Economist) who had turned Romania into "das Aethiopen Europas" [the European Ethiopia] (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) (Georgescu 1991: 268).

Domestic Policies: Peculiarities of the Romanian Socialized Agriculture

With the new orientation of foreign policy, some significant changes were recorded in domestic policy after 1960 as well. The new constitution adopted in 1965 clearly stipulated this political shift, giving less weight to the Eastern "brother liberator" (Georgescu 1991: 251).

² The "emigration tax" was suspended in 1983 (Fischer-Galati 1998: 472).

³ In a speech delivered in 1984 after a trip to Eastern Europe (Georgescu 1991: 267).

Yet, since 1949 the entire Romanian economy, including agricultural production, had increasingly been organized following the Stalinist model, in accordance with the state centralized planning. Specifically, after the completion of the collectivization process in 1962, the communist party established a number of five-year plans for economic and social development as follows: 1966-1970, 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, and the last one, 1986-1990, which was interrupted by the 1989 revolution. Ceausescu had recognized many times the necessity of modernization of the entire economy of the country, but he strongly believed in a strict centralization, with detailed planning by the communist party (Parpala 1969, Turnock 1976 & 1991 a, b, c; Georgescu 1991, Kideckel 1993, Cartwright 2001).

In order to better understand the most important critical issues in rural Romania, it is important to understand the major characteristic of domestic politics during the Golden Age, the period of so-called *neo-Stalinism* (Deletant 1999, Deletant 2004). Specifically, Stalinist economics, requiring detailed planning and absolute centralization of every aspect of existence, created an inevitable *neo-Stalinist* domestic politics. This was initiated by the 11th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) in March 1974, when, through the nomination of Ceausescu as President of Romania, the post-1960 era of “enlightened despotism” ended and the country’s politics returned “to the methods, goals, and value systems of the fifties” (Georgescu 1991: 256). Less brutal than the original model, but with selective repression methods, it was during the period of *neo-Stalinism* (1974 to 1989) that the highest level of the cult of personality of a family dynasty was reached. This political regime, composed of a small group of elites, many of them Ceausescu’s family members or close relatives, controlled not only the party but also the key positions in the government, including agriculture. This “dynastic socialism,” without precedent in Romania’s history, ended with the seizure of the entire political establishment of the country (p. 257). The triumph of this extreme personalization of power, sustained by a delirious “hagiography,” ended the timid decentralization process initiated by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the former Prime Minister⁴, with catastrophic consequences for the entire economy, especially for agriculture and rural areas (p. 258). The 1966-1970 Five-Year Plan called for rapid economic development focusing on heavy industry, especially the petrochemical, steel, and machine-building industries. As a result, the allocation of funds for agriculture was far below that for industry, respectively between 12.8% and 16% of all investment, while industry accounted for between 49% in 1965 and 47.5% in 1970 (Cartwright 2001; <http://wwwcommunismulinromania.ro/>, retrieved in April 2009). This budget was less than the proportion allocated during the 1960-1965 Plan (19.5%), but it was nevertheless better than what had been allocated during the first communist plans: 9% in 1949, 7% in 1950, and 7.5% in 1953. These funds were primarily used to strengthen the new farms that had been created by the final phase of collectivization.

Moreover, while exports of grain and meat products were projected to double between 1970 and 1974, the allocation for agriculture decreased even more, from 16% to 13%. According to the 1986 Romanian Statistical Yearbook, cited in Georgescu (1991), the structure of investments in the Romanian economy during the first half of the 1980s continued to show a significant discrepancy between industry and agriculture. While industrial development still continued to receive “the lion’s share of investment,” around half of the total investment during the 1980s, agriculture received an annual average of only 16% for the same time period (Cartwright 2001: 91, Table 1). Overall, agriculture never received more than a fifth of the state investment budget and, in addition, the levels of investment fluctuated widely from plan to plan, or even from year to year, making longer-term planning difficult. Doubtlessly, these figures show the general attitude toward agriculture, expecting to receive great profits without investing much in modernizing it.

Ceausescu’s ambitious goals for the acceleration of heavy industry’s development during the 1971-1975 Five-Year Plan affected agriculture even further. Specifically, the rapid industrialization, which created a diversity of outlets for the Romanian work force, as well as low agricultural wages, encouraged a massive rural-urban migration (Woolley 1975, Georgescu 1991, Cartwright 2001, Sabates-Wheeler 2004). The long-term negative consequence was village depopulation, followed by an acute shortage of agricultural labor. The problem was resolved from year to year by obliging millions of non-agriculturalist people from a diversity of governmental domains, including students and soldiers, to work in agriculture. This was most pronounced each September-October, during the fall harvesting, when over two million students from all levels, together with their professors, had to leave their classes to work in the fields for several weeks.

⁴ Ion Gheorghe Maurer served as Prime Minister under both Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu, 1961-1974 (Deletant 1999: 104, 124).

Not only were they not paid for their work but, furthermore, their school work had to be made up on the weekends, when normal school programs were rescheduled (my personal experience, multiple interviews with teachers, June 2007, Onesti and Iasi, Romania).

This situation seems hard to understand, taking into account the high percentage of the population that was rural and employed in agriculture. For example, according to the Romanian Statistical Yearbook (2006, 2007), the percentage of Romania's population that lived in rural areas decreased continuously during the communist period, from 78.6% in 1930 to 61.8% in 1966 and 56.4% in 1977. Nevertheless, at the sunset of the Golden Age, almost half of Romania's population still lived in the countryside (Table 2). Although agricultural employment recorded similar dramatic changes, from 74.1% in 1950 to 27.5% in 1989, relative to other European countries (e.g., Belgium and the United Kingdom with 3%, the Netherlands with 5%) the percentage of agricultural labor in Romania was still high (Cole 1997, Verdery 2003, Balanica 2005, Tables 2, Table 3). Many other countries, several from Western Europe, recorded a high percent of their population as being rural in the eighties (see Table 3). Therefore, Romania was not unique in this respect in Europe. However, in no country did people have such experiences with agriculture as in Romania.

Until 1977 the majority of Romanians found Ceausescu's rule relatively tolerable. Yet, the negative consequences of the country's external affairs were accentuated by Ceausescu's unrealistic high goals for the 1976-1980 and 1981-1985 Five-Year Plans regarding agricultural production and expanded trade with the West and the Third World (Fischer-Galati 1998, Cartwright 2001). In this light, both plans were revised several times, each time increasing the budget for industrial development and grain production, despite an already strong economic imbalance and the clear signs of an economic crisis at the end of the 1970s. Even worse, Ceausescu tried to secure much of the needed hard currencies through the massive exportation of agricultural products, especially to Western Europe. This, in turn, entailed the adoption of a series of measures designed to increase agricultural production without, however, providing the peasantry with any incentives. Those short steps to create incentives for the private-plots and non-collectivized peasant producers proposed during the late 1960s were abandoned by the early 1970s. Georgescu (1991: 259), describing the situation of Romania's domestic politics during the early 1980s, has suggested that the five decrees on agriculture issued in 1983 treated it as "a moral and political issue" rather than "a function of the market."

One example of viewing agriculture as a moral issue is that of raising cattle, which was seen by the communists as "an honor and a duty" for the Romanian peasants (Georgescu 1991: 259). Peasants were given clear obligations to register all their domestic animals at the local government offices, as well as high fines and even imprisonment for slaughtering animals privately. In addition, a requirement restricting deliveries of agricultural produce to the state abolished in 1956 was reintroduced in 1983. In this light, the peasants were required to sell their produce only with the state, at very low prices established by the state. Moreover, the sizes of the private plots were decreased by decree and the price ceilings, including severe limits, further discouraged the private producers who supplied the farm markets with food, deepening the food shortage (Georgescu 1991, Jackson 1997). As a result, it was not uncommon for peasants to prefer to feed their pigs with the milk from their cows instead of selling it for a humiliatingly low price imposed by the state. For solving their food needs, many urban people had established long-term arrangements with the peasants, letting them deliver their produce directly to their houses, avoiding the market places (multiple interviews, June 2007, farm market Onesti, Romania). The peasants required, in general, decent prices and, most importantly, their produce was organically grown. These and many other examples show that agriculture and the peasants continued to be treated with a total lack of understanding, imposing "Phanariot" regulations and increasing central control even more.

Agricultural exports, together with the inefficiency of production methods and an excessively rigid centralization of planning, brought desperate food shortages, forcing the party in 1981 to reintroduce rationing of basic food products⁵, such as bread, meat, milk, oil, and sugar (Fischer-Galati 1998, Georgescu 1991, Cartwright 2001). This paradoxical decision was made in the context of recording the biggest grain crop in Romania's history (over 20 million tonnes in 1980)⁶ (Table 4). During those years, it was common to see people in line at 2:00 AM, or even earlier, in front of the grocery store, in the dark streets, waiting on their small stools for the store to open at 6:00 AM, to be sure that they would be lucky enough to buy some food.

⁵ It had discontinued in 1954 (Georgescu 1991: 260).

⁶ Double than in 1970

As if the situation were not bad enough, a *Rational Eating Program* was promulgated on Ceausescu's initiative, claiming that Romanians ate too much and setting limits of food consumption per capita for the period 1982-1985 (Georgescu 1991, Jackson 1997). Consequently, Romanians' standard of living was worse off in the eighties than in the sixties, with Romania experiencing the most dramatic economic situation since the Second World War⁷.

The key problems thus facing Ceausescu in the early 1980s were economic: high prices for imports, especially oil and iron ore for the over expanded petrochemical and steel industries and, overall, enormous external debts, which, according to Fischer-Galati (1998), were over \$10 billion. Consequently, in the 1980s, Ceausescu imposed a draconian conservation regime (cutting the showing of evening TV programs to only two-three hours per night, cutting night hours for the centralized heating system, restrictions on using home appliances, an imposed schedule for driving cars, on even or uneven days, and the systematic interruption of power, without an established schedule).

Finally, Ceausescu ordered the development of a plan to "modernize" villages, called rural systematization, through which the traditional villages would be replaced with so-called agro-food or "*agro-alimentary centers*" (Fischer-Galati 1998: 474; Jackson 1997). In this plan, the peasants had to leave their houses and were forced to move into high-rise concrete apartments, often without amenities. The aim of this program was to introduce more land into the agricultural circuit and to eliminate the peasants' independence and spirit, as well as to replace the traditional elements of the Romanian rural society with the socialist ones of *the new man*.

Conclusion

In sum, Romania's position in the world system was profoundly changed by communist rule and Soviet domination. The goal of the communist party was to ensure that by 1990 Romania reached the level of economic development of a "medium-developed country" and that by 2000 it would prosper as a "multilaterally developed socialist country" (Georgescu 1991: 268). The long-term objective was thus an ideological one, expressed again in the President's speech in November 1988 as follows:

We must always bear in mind that resolving all these problems is an objective requirement for achieving a superior stage of the multilaterally developed socialist society and for creating the necessary preconditions for a gradual advance towards the golden dream, towards communism.

(Ceausescu, cited in Ronnas 1989: 550)

In its effort to reach this goal, agricultural policy functioned for 40 years as the heavy artillery of the Communist Party against the Romanian peasants. In addition, systematization under Ceausescu could be considered even more than a planning process. It threatened to destroy a traditional way of life linked with the land and the identity of the village and its inhabitants. As it turned out, the Romanian communist paradise was destined to come to a quick end, which happened on December 22, 1989, one accelerated by both the impact of domestic politics and the advent of Soviet *glasnost* and *perestroika*.

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⁷ This is the reason for which a series of data was interdicted to be released to the public, especially after 1985, and much of that released was intentionally distorted.

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Map & Tables



Figure 1 Romania: Physical Map

Source: <http://www.presidency.ro/>

Table 1 The Structure of Investments in Romania, 1981-1985(percentage)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Industry	50.7	46.9	48.0	51.7	48.3
Agriculture	15.8	15.6	17.2	14.9	17.7

Source: Anuarul Statistic (Statistical Yearbook), 1986, cited in Georgescu 1991

Table 2: Romanian Population by Area: Rural Population and Agricultural Employment, 1930-1989

Year Census Date (C)	Total Population (millions of inhabitants)	Rural Population (as percentage of total pop)	Employment in Agriculture (as percentage of total labor force)
Dec. 29, 1930 (C)	14.2	78.6	90.4
Jan. 25, 1948 (C)	15.8	76.6	
1950	16.3	n. a.	74.1
Feb. 21, 1956 (C)	17.4	68.7	
1960	18.4	67.9	65.4
1965	19.0	66.3	
July 1, 1966 (C)	19.1	61.8	
1970	20.2	63.1	49.1
1975	21.2	60.7	
July 1, 1977 (C)	21.5	56.4	
1980	22.2	54.2	29.4
1985	22.7	50.0	
1989	23.1	46.8	27.5

Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2006; Romanian Statistical Yearbook 1990, cited in Balanica 2005 and Cartwright 2001; Agricultural Statistics of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 1950-1966; Hitchins 1994

Table 3: Europe: Rural Population and Agricultural Employment, 1980

Country	Rural Population (as percentage of total population)	Employment in Agriculture (as percentage of total employment)
Austria	35	11
Belgium	5	3
Bulgaria	39	24
Czech Republic	25	13
Denmark	16	8
Estonia	30	15
Finland	40	13
France	27	8
Germany	17	n. a.
Greece	42	30
Hungary	43	22
Ireland	45	18
Italy	33	14
Latvia	32	16
Lithuania	39	28
Netherlands	12	5
Norway	30	8
Poland	42	30
Portugal	71	27
Romania	51	30
Slovakia	48	14
Slovenia	52	16
Spain	27	19
Sweden	17	6
Switzerland	43	7
United Kingdom	11	3

Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank, 2001⁸

Table 4: Total Grain Yield, 1965 – 1989

Year	Total Grain Area (thousands of ha)	Total Production (thousands of tonnes)	Total Grain Yield (tonnes/ha)
1965	6,759	12,594	1.9
1966	6,818	13,896	2.0
1970	5,897	10,630	1.8
1972	6,237	16,911	2.7
1976	6,283	19,739	3.1
1980	6,447	20,172	3.1
1985	6,238	19,704	3.2
1989	5,971	18,419	3.1

Source: International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000 (Calculated from individual absolute data)

⁸ Some statistical data from the several international sources are slightly different from Romania's statistics.