Double Oral Auctions and Tendencies toward Moral Hazard
Vladimír Gazda, Matúš Kubák, Zuzana Maliková, MarekGróf

Abstract
Paper uses an economic experiment with 96 subjects to examine the tendencies of economic agents towards moral hazard. Design of the experiment allowed simulating third party’s intervention on a market (e.g. state funding accelerating purchase, health care insurance function on the market with health care). Obtained data are statistically evaluated and it is shown, that economic agents incline to moral hazard in case, when it is possible. Study shows how rational agents became less rational in terms of average market price, after intervention of a third party on the market. Third party intervention raises the average market prices presenting a manifestation of moral hazard. It is shown, that under given assumptions, even rational economic agents diverge from rational and market efficient strategies and behave irresponsibly. During experiment we observed robust deviation in equilibrium market price before and after the third party intervention.

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