

The Adverse Role of US in Afghan Peace Process after 2001

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Abstract

Peace and security have been a nightmare scenario for Afghanistan in the last four decades. After more than nineteen years of incessant war with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, the United States was ultimately compelled to negotiate a peace deal. It is argued among other reasons that it has been unsuccessful in its pursuit of eliminating terrorism and securing peace in the region because of its face-saving priorities and reputation considerations. This was particularly visible in its decision to deliberately exclude the Afghan national government and other regional stakeholders from numerous peace talks with the Taliban. This fundamentally punctured the likelihood of a generally acceptable and durable peace deal. It reflected the US malign tactics in bolstering spoilers of peace in Afghanistan. The Afghan national government in its effort to bring stability to the country now faces the risk of exacerbated civil strife. This paper argues that the adverse impact of the United States role on the peace process in Afghanistan.

Keywords: Afghanistan, United States, Taliban, Peace Progress, Political Reconciliation.

1.1 Introduction

After the 9/11 attacks, the US government charged Al-Qaeda whose leadership was based at that time in Afghanistan, and thus the US decided to attack Afghanistan to curb terrorism, militancy, fundamentalism, and extremism from the world. Bush eventually calls on the Taliban regime to “deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land,” (Yglesias, 2011) or share in their fate, but the Taliban government of Afghanistan refused. Then-President George W. Bush signs into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking the United States on 9/11. The U.S. military with NATO supports begins a bombing campaign against Taliban forces, officially launching Operation Enduring Freedom. After the fall of the Taliban regime in November 2001, the United Nations invites major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and a group led by the former king (Zahir shah), to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions sign the Bonn Agreement, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1383(John, and Sullivan, 2002, p.83-96). After this, on April 17, 2002, President George W. Bush calls for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute. “By helping to build an Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in which to live” (Kerry, 2010). After President Bush, his successor President Obama had announced in December 2009 the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. President Obama outlines a plan to withdraw thirty-three thousand troops by the summer of 2012 the surge troops sent in December 2009 including ten thousand by the end of 2011. Polls show a record number of Americans do not support the war, and Obama faces pressure from lawmakers, particularly Democrats, to sizably reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Obama confirms that the U.S. is holding preliminary peace talks with the Taliban leadership. With reconciliation in mind, the UN Security Council days earlier splits a sanctions list between members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, making it easier to add and remove people and entities. For getting way to withdraw the US felt need a peace process to end the war in Afghanistan, after 9.11, the Afghan people and the international community have made many efforts,-national reconciliation in Afghanistan to bring peace but it is one of the most concerned and difficult issues for successive Afghan governments as well as US, NATO and other allies engaged in Afghanistan. At the beginning of 2002, Taliban elements contacted the Afghan Interim Government President Karzai in an attempt to "obtain certain benefits from the Kabul authorities". However, as the United States determined that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were the same, they rudely used "force power, "Interfered with Karzai's dialogue with the Taliban, and eventually weaned (Amin, 2002, p. 47-56).

On December 19, 2005, in Promoted by a series of government projects, the first elected parliament in Afghanistan convened the first formal meeting that attracted much attention at home and abroad, which marked the official end of the "Bonn" process and Afghanistan to complete the political democratic process (2014 حسینی, p.47). In addition, the US and the international community has also held many meetings to extend the term of the International Security

Assistance Force several times to promote reconciliation, such as the 2006 Musa Qala Accord, UN Security Council Resolutions 1659 and 1707, Declaration of the 2007 Afghan Peace Patriarch Conference, etc. (Astri and Strand, 2002).

From late 2004 to early 2008, the United States neither supported nor encouraged Afghanistan to ease relations with the Taliban, but was able to tolerate Karzai's government pardoning lower-level Taliban elements. As a result, Afghanistan has gradually formed a reconciliation peace talks model of political reconciliation and the process of reconciliation has moved from mutual tentative trials to you come and go interaction stages (2011, یوسفی, P. 97-124).

On March 31, 2009, American President Barack Obama announced the implementation of the "Afghanistan Strategy", which implies that the United States has fundamentally changed it's because the use of military means only is not enough to eliminate the Taliban and terrorism in Afghanistan. Obama believes that the Taliban should be treated differently. The Taliban has a stubborn core of leadership. It must use force to defeat this core class. It needs to be completely defeated (Tim, Dilemmas, 2013, p.118-139). However, some people are under coercion or just for the sake of money, food, and weapons; these Afghan militants must be given a chance to change course; therefore, we will work with local leaders, the Afghan central government, US, and international allies to initiate a reconciliation process in each province of Afghanistan, as the enemy team the shrinking of the Taliban will inevitably lead to further isolation, because it cannot provide any benefit to the local Afghan people except terror and repression, and we will keep on to support the basic human rights of all Afghans, as well as women. A fundamental change in US attitudes heralds a new impetus for the reconciliation process in Afghanistan (Noah, 2009). The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Plan can be divided into three phases.

The first phase involves activities such as social outreach, trust-building, government, and non-governmental organization negotiations, mobilizing local Counsel. The second phase involves a 90-day demobilization process. Disarmed fighters registered in the Reintegrated Tracking and Monitoring database under the jurisdiction of the Joint Secretariat. The government provides identity cards to these ex-combatants to guarantee their ability to move freely and receive amnesty. Expecting the return of these fighters, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Plan committee promised to resolve relocation and resettlement requests.

The third phase is Peaceful Consolidation and Support for Community Recovery included option pans based on capacity, security, and the diverse needs of different communities. This is the longest period, which requires the cooperation of the Kabul government, regional independent governance institutions, communities and tribes, and especially the continued funding and technical support of the international community (Marissa, 2012, p. 55-57).

In June 2013, a spokesman of the Afghan Taliban issued a statement saying that the Taliban had opened a new peace talks office in Doha, Qatar. Subsequently, Afghan President Karzai expressed a strong interest in peace talks with Taliban representatives (Greg and Mclay, 2011), but he set a prerequisite for the peace talks, that is, he demanded that the Taliban must remove the white banner hanging on the peace talks. In response, the Taliban were deeply dissatisfied and accused the United States and Karzai of deliberately finding faults, hoping to use this as an excuse to bring the negotiations to a deadlock. The fact and goals behind different US governments are "For George W. Bush, the goal was the destruction of al-Qaeda, the total defeat of the Taliban, and a "stable and free and peaceful" Afghanistan. For Barack Obama, it was a degraded Taliban that could be reasoned with but would have to renounce violence, respect women, and abide by the Afghan constitution. For Donald Trump, it was just a reduction in violence and a clear path to the door the Afghans themselves would have to figure out the rest" (Gilsinan, 2020).

1.1.2. Contradiction with Afghan Government

The U.S is one of the most influential external participants in the Afghan reconciliation process. However, the United States' strong guidance of the reconciliation process has made reconciliation out of the reality of Afghanistan, and its hindering effects are often greater than advancing (Thomas, 2019). The formulation and implementation of Afghanistan's reconciliation policy are constrained by the United States; the United States sets obstacles to peace talks from its counter-terrorism strategy. Since the Bonn agreement, the international community has called for reconciliation as a means to achieve lasting peace in Afghanistan, but the United States' reconciliation plan has never taken the Taliban into account until 2018. Even though Karzai intended to reconcile with the Taliban once and announced that he would pardon the Taliban, but he quickly withdrew the statement because of U.S. opposition obviously, the Afghan national reconciliation policy has changed from the implementation object, content, and steps to subsequent adjustments and evaluations by US interests and policies. In February 2011, Hillary Clinton stated in a public speech that there are three conditions for the United States to negotiate with the Taliban, namely, to cease fire, cut relations with Al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution (Marc, 2014, p. 21-37). what the United States cares about is that the Taliban will stop attacking foreign forces and no longer provide assistance to Al Qaeda, and how the Taliban and

the Afghan government reconcile, and what kind of political sharing agreement is secondary. For the United States, facilitating the political reconciliation agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban is part of its exit strategy, which allows the United States-led NATO coalition to withdraw from

Afghanistan in a relatively decent manner. In response to the three conditions of the United States, the Taliban also put forward the three requirements for reconciliation that are, the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan's territory, the amendment of the constitution, and the sharing of power (Farooq, 2009). As the initial reason for the Taliban to launch a "jihad", the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan is the deepest hatred of the Taliban. However, on the one hand, the United States intends to lead the reconciliation process, while on the other hand neither abandons legal garrisons nor stops drone attacks, which makes the Afghan government widely condemned by the Taliban, the opposition, and even the people in the peace talks. Subsequently, on December 6, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hager made a surprise visit to Afghanistan and stated that in the first few months of 2015, the number of American land forces in Afghanistan will reach 10,800 and will be reduced to 5,500 by the end of 2015. NATO will resolutely support non-combat missions. At the same time, the United States has called on its allies to maintain more troops in Afghanistan (Gülden, 2013). This decision by the United States once again pushed the Taliban to the opposite side, making the complex and complicated situation of Afghanistan reconciliation even more confusing.

The American factor is the most direct and influential external factor encountered in the process of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. From past reconciliation experience, it is not difficult to see that the current process of reconciliation in Afghanistan is the process of peace talks between the United States and the Taliban, and the Afghan government is mostly in a foiled or even forgotten position.

The significant conditions which are made for the Taliban are vital not only for Afghanistan but also for others who are involved in Afghanistan. These conditions are cutting their relations with Al Qaida, Accepting the constitution, and making a ceasefire. Mainly reconciliation process without the participation of the Afghan government is not recognized by Afghanistan's government and the Afghan people and can't be considered to its greater role in bringing peace in Afghanistan. Important to mention here that the United States has own policies where almost struggles to safeguard its interests not only in Afghanistan but through its existence in Afghanistan they want to secure its interests in the whole region and put their eyes over other countries closely, evermore they are therefore escalating such harsh situation in Afghanistan peace process for their interests, the US is sure that to safeguard its interests or to reach there are directly or indirectly encroaching in all departments and not letting the legitimate Afghan government perform and implement its policies.

As for concerning the situation regarding peace there are many aspects to be mentioned, first which is important and has always given a tough time and has put its impacts over the situation of Afghanistan form last four decades, which is the subject matter of United States and its involvements both politically and security. The United States has always struggled to keep the Afghan government weak for its interest.

1.1.3. U.S. Competition with Other Involved Countries

As the security situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, international terrorists such as the "Islamic State" are active in Afghanistan, and all parties of the Afghan issue, including regional countries, have been more actively involved to find a way out of the peace process (Sam, and Gülden, 2013). Negotiation, unlike war, is not a win-lose game. Stakeholders who obtain a "win-lose" orientation to peace are unlikely to achieve sustainable results. There are three approaches to conciliation. Soft negotiation assumes that reaching an agreement requires the acceptance of concessions, losses, and compromise. Hard negotiation assumes that winning requires making threats, demanding concessions, and sticking to strict public positions requiring the other side to lose. Successful peace processes require principled negotiation where the aim is to solve problems by finding options that meet the basic underlying interests winning position for all players. Principled negotiation desires to create a "zero-sum game" among the players that all players try to achieve their own interest that will not be acceptable by the others. Principled negotiation is interest-based; it requires each player to identify their core, underlying interests, and needs beyond their public positions. An analysis of the underlying interests of all parties, beyond their public statements, can assist in finding mutually satisfying agreements or outcomes that all sides can live with. Principled negotiation is unlike positional negotiation where players make absolutist public positions that make progress complex. Consultations based on wholesale compliance have a high risk of failure. It is best to avoid preconditions to talks as they make it impossible to even learn about the other player's interests or to explore creative options for addressing underlying interests (Katja, 20-02). In Afghanistan peace the US plays a unilateral role, the US tries to secure her, own interest with the Taliban without of Afghanistan Central Government and regional players' interest, to solving the Afghanistan issue need to understand all

internal and external players directly or indirectly involved in Afghanistan peace. The goal of the negotiation was not to establish lasting peace but to achieve a diplomatic victory and promote American interests.

Therefore, to create the goal and failure of the national reconciliation plan on excessive red lines, it is ensured and ineffectiveness that the Taliban and the Afghan government remain fully separate and insist on the ratification of a bilateral security agreement of continued presence of the U.S military in Afghanistan, after 2014. For better understanding the current conflict in Afghanistan it is essential to preview the Soviet Union intervention, On December 27, 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan claimed they support peace and stability, replaced Amin with another PDPA members and establish the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) after the ten-year war with the mujahedeen (Islamic fighter including 7 groups) the Soviet leader recognized there is no military solution in Afghanistan conflict. The Soviet Union attempt to negotiate with Mujahedeen, Pakistan, and the U.S.A. The Mujahedeen demand to withdrawal the military from Afghanistan altimetry on February 15, 1989, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev completely withdrawal from Afghanistan, leaving the Najibullah government in power (Bruce, 2014, p. 135-137). The result mujahedeen against the Najibullah government untitled the DRA collapse and all militant groups began to struggle for power against each other led Afghanistan to civil war and chaos, current negation between the Taliban, the Afghan government, U.S, Pakistan, Russia, and China. The actors will be playing a zero-sum game in the negotiation.

In the Trump speech in 2017, the US president announced what he described as a new approach to Pakistan, saying: "We can no longer talk about Pakistan's safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups. This is a threat to the region and beyond" (Myer, 2017). Afghanistan geopolitically so important for the US and regional countries, because that every stakeholder in Afghanistan can play her role (Ivan, 2017). The US has security and economic interests in the region, therefore the US play the role to achieve her interest through negotiation which was not achieved by forces for almost two decades. Jon said Pakistan prefers a weak government in Kabul because "Pakistan and Afghanistan have border problem" (Jon, 2015), On the other hand, Pakistan worries about the Indian influence in Afghanistan, so this is a good opportunity for Islamabad to peruse its goal in the Afghan peace process.

The Iran religious government cannot tolerate the US military presence in Afghan military bases; Iran has a long history of hostility with the US. Iran can play a great role in Afghanistan particularly in the western part. Russia did not interest to see the Taliban come to power again but Russia's main goal is to see the US also lose in Afghanistan so Russia will play his role such as the US play during the cold war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority for China, China has a small border with Afghanistan, and silk road passes through Afghanistan so China looking for economic interests in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally. President Trump mentioned neither Iran nor Russia in his August 2017 speech, and it is unclear how, if at all, the U.S. approaches them might have changed as part of the new strategy. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority for China in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally. In his speech, President Trump urged India to play a greater role in Afghanistan's economic development. This, along with other government messages, has compounded Pakistani concerns about Indian activity in Afghanistan. India has been the biggest regional partner in Afghanistan's reconstruction, but New Delhi does not want to establish a deeper defense relationship with Kabul.

Russia has initiated the Afghan Peace Conference, the "Moscow Process," under its leadership. In November 2018, the Moscow process held a new round of meetings and achieved significant results. China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia all sent representatives to the meeting (Ruttig, 2018). the United States diplomats stationed in the Russian Embassy as observers attended the meeting; although the Afghan government refused to send Diplomatic representatives attended the meeting, but also sent representatives of its "High Peace Commission" responsible for peace affairs; the Taliban Doha Political Office sent a five-member delegation to the meeting (Greath, 2015).

The Taliban peace talks representative said that the door to understanding and negotiation has always been open and put forward requirements to end international sanctions on Taliban and release Taliban prisoners from jail; and publicly called on the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan following Islamic principles, Afghan national interests, and historical traditions, Ways to amend the Afghan Constitution. Iran is an important neighbor of western Afghanistan and has close historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan. It has always followed closely the evolution of the situation in Afghanistan, including the peace process. In advancing the peace process, the Iranian authorities are actively involved in the future of Afghanistan's internal affairs and geopolitical arrangements to avoid a US-led peace process. On December 30, 2018, Taliban representatives visited Iran and held talks with Iranian officials to discuss how to achieve peace and stability in Afghanistan. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Kasimi said the following day that Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and the Taliban representatives had a full-fledged dialogue with the goal of promoting peace talks between different factions in Afghanistan as soon as possible, thereby achieving peace and stability in

Afghanistan. Earlier, Ali, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, visited the Afghan capital Kabul, during which he informed the Afghan government that "Iran is in contact with the Taliban to advance the Afghan peace process" (Valentina, 2010, p.27-38).

The goal of the negotiation was not to establish lasting peace but to achieve a diplomatic victory and promote American interests. Therefore, to create the goal and failure of the national reconciliation plan on excessive red lines, it is ensured and ineffectiveness that the

Taliban and the Afghan government remain fully separate and insist on the ratification of a bilateral security agreement of continued presence of the U.S military in Afghanistan, after 2014. In addition, to restart the Afghan peace process as soon as possible, China and the United States, two permanent members of the Security Council, actively participated in the establishment of the Quartet Coordination Group Mechanism of China, the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in early 2016 to focus on the early restoration of direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Pakistan fears if Afghanistan becomes a strong country then it will demand the annexation of Durand line areas which was taken through an agreement, second is that which Pakistan fears from the involvement of India in Afghanistan, and therefore they are following their proxies for these decades, even Iran is also playing its role to safeguard its interest in Afghanistan, last but not the least from the north side there is Russia, she is waiting for her revenge from the US here and therefore has shown its optimism regarding the US military intervention in Afghanistan. The proxies by these major countries which are mainly involved in Afghanistan has made worsen the situation of Afghanistan and each of them indirectly want Afghanistan to be their war-place, which has made Afghanistan far from having lasting peace in near future and it's all because of their great games which they are playing in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's geopolitical importance plays a significant role with context to diverging interests of global and regional actors vis-à-vis that of the United States. Since, American military intervention in Afghanistan, Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan balanced against the presence of the United States for several reasons. One important reason is, since Afghanistan is the gateway to the Central Asian States which have potentially untapped energy resources. The regional Actors want direct access through Afghanistan to these natural resources to meet their dire energy demands. Because of the American military presence in the region, the regional countries particularly Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia felt threatened, and they began to oppose and to protect their interests connected with Afghanistan's peace and security. The notion is that, in the long presence of the United States, these states that have economic and security interests in Afghanistan would be in danger. As mentioned earlier, in Afghanistan, China has several ongoing projects are underway, and these projects have been on several occasions sabotaged by different transnational actors. Likewise, Pakistan has a direct border link with Afghanistan, has several stakes lies in both Afghanistan and needs access to Central Asia. Pakistan also has concerns about the presence of America and for that, it has also made strong connections with China so that mutual interests could be met by joining hands together. Similarly, Iran and Russia being strategic partnership have deep political and economic interests in Afghanistan and arch-rivals of the United States. Both countries must oppose the actions of the United States and potentially threatening both countries interests in the Afghan mainland and with that of Central Asia. it means the diverging interests in Afghanistan of regional and American interests, politico-military outcomes would in the long term seems not conducive for lasting peace in Afghanistan. Unless these could have a political consensus on the said diverging interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan internal reconciliation.

1.1.4. US Quick Fix Method of Afghan Nation-Building

The Obama administration is comprehensively promoting the adjustment of Afghanistan's policy, gradually abandoning the initial goal of completely eradicating regional terrorist forces, and instead focused on cracking down on 'bases' and their affiliates to prevent them from continuing to use Afghanistan's territory to threaten the security of the United States and its allies (Morgan, 2010). At the same time, the United States attaches greater importance to Afghanistan's strategic position as a key to tackle the affairs of Central Asia, West Asia, and South Asia, and actively seeks a layout for the "post-US military era". After 2014, the US has maintained its military presence in Afghanistan and builds a regional security framework led by it to seek geopolitical advantages in the core area of Asia. All the US military and humanitarian activities encompass their greater interest in Afghanistan. As the strategic location of Afghanistan is a concern, there would be more challenges for the peace to be achieved in the recent future, although the US has its direct involvement in this matter of fact. Even more, the US has struggled with its method to fix and build the Afghan nation, but on the second side of the coin, they are limiting their struggles just up to their interest areas. More often still they are focusing on their security not giving the priority to the security of Afghanistan. As we have seen the main agenda which they emphasize over it in peace talks with the Taliban is not the cease-fire in Afghanistan but, that Afghanistan's

lands couldn't be used against the US in the future. Such kinds of approaches by the US clear that they are certainly in the fever of security in Afghanistan alongside the region.

1.1.5. U.S. Strategy Changes Give Taliban Resurgence

Since the 9/11 incident, the United States is fighting a war on terror but not only Al-Qaeda all other terrorist organizations against which the war on terror was started could not be eliminated, but their strength has been increased and international terrorism became more intense and rampant. Nineteen years have been passed but the Taliban could not be wiped out from Afghanistan but became the Taliban more powerful than 20 years ago.

Wrong, that the international counter-terrorism center is still in Afghanistan and implementing the Afghan strategy to increase the size of the garrison in Afghanistan, which has restrained the Taliban to a certain extent the development momentum with Al Qaeda, is not good. The United States announced the end of the Afghan war in 2011. The United States and NATO began to withdraw their troops. In 2014, the withdrawal of troops and the transfer of the Afghan government began (Robert, 2009). So, the Taliban's activities have set off a wave again since 2015, occupying a large area of Afghanistan. The withdrawal also has a close relationship with Obama's shift of strategic focus from the Middle East and Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the United States and its allies once believed that the Taliban had suffered an absolute blow and it was difficult to rise again. A small Afghan national force would be sufficient its annihilation. It is precise that the United States was eager to strategically shift before the extremist Taliban and terrorist organizations were eliminated so that the Taliban and terrorist organizations have the opportunity to resurrect again and again. This is also one of the external reasons why the Taliban can die and remain dead.

There are many reasons for not elimination terrorism but strengthen and give Taliban resurgence.

First, after the withdrawal announcement, the US became not serious to fight Taliban wholeheartedly because US policymakers conclude that they cannot eliminate the Taliban from Afghanistan.

Second, with the policy change, the US also decreased its funding to Afghanistan which also affected US counter Taliban operation in Afghanistan. This thing also leads to automatically give Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

Third; after policy change now the US was mostly in search of how to get a safe way from Afghanistan, therefore, giving less attention to military operations which gave Taliban chance to reorganize and get strengthen.

Forth, US withdrawal announcement and the policy change also encouraged the Taliban that they are winner which give Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

Fifth; after the policy change, the US recognized the Taliban as a political entity that also gives Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

Sixth, the US government had decreased its forces which also allowed the Taliban to reorganize themselves, improve their capabilities as pressure over them had decreased which helped them a lot to a resurgence in Afghanistan.

Seventh, After US policy change many of her allies withdraw their forces from Afghanistan and even many allied withdraw their forces before withdrawal which also lead to the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

Eight, relocation of US strategic center to the Middle East also left the United States forces in Afghanistan a little unable to fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan properly.

Ninth, the US policy change also weakens the capabilities of Afghanistan's army and police to fight the Taliban which also leads to Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

Tenth, when in the post-2014 era U.S and NATO started the withdrawal of its forces therefore 2015, occupying a large area of Afghanistan.

Eleventh, in the US attack a lot of civilians were killing and in retaliation, their family members and beloved ones were recorded to join Taliban organizations to fight against the US and her allies who had killed their beloved ones.

Twelfth, most of the Taliban after the collapse of their regime in Kabul go to mountains and the US and the subsequent Afghanistan government could not have the capabilities to pursue them and fight them in mountains as all Afghanistan is covered by very hard mountains.

Thirteen, the US has compelled the Taliban to vacate Kabul but could not remove its soft image in many provinces which have provided Taliban continuous backup and opportunity to escape from US forces and lunch successful attacks against them and Afghanistan officials.

Fourteen, the US also failed to break its supply chain, money collection, and weapons, which also get the capability to stand up against the US and the Afghan government.

Fifteenth, still many regional and extra-regional countries who have enmity with the US are supporting the Taliban and providing them weapons, money, and other types of required supports.

1.1.6. US Support Local Warlords and Weaken Central Government Power

Before 2001, US powers had virtually no attendance in the region but just the Central Intelligence Agency had the major capability in Afghanistan because the CIA was worked with the insurgents during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, and after the Soviet war,

Afghanistan was plagued by civil war at that period CIA was the main organization to fighting Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Since 2001, the US government has primarily decided to work with Afghan warlords to win the battle against the insurgency. Barack Obama is expected to move again to a warlord strategy with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. In this strategy, the United States will trust local warlords and support them against the Taliban, instead of giving them more wealth to struggling the insurgency and independence to run their areas. While such a plan is bound to significantly decrease

Afghanistan's central government power, American policymakers may rely on the Afghanistan government's benevolent role to preserve any appearance of a central administration in Kabul.

The Washington administration supports the local warlords, despite Kabul's instructions, using their close relations with US forces and governorship control during the Karzai administration working to create an equivalent militia that was useful than the Afghan National Army. They controlled most of the foreign aid in the province and made sure that the majority of the money and rebuilding projects went to their closest supporters and people. They controlled the huge sums generated by customs receipts that came through the province and refused to share that revenue with the Kabul government. Some of the warlords were engaged in drug trafficking also. Practically their performance is deteriorated the administration of Kabul, isolated the regional proximity, and worsened the overhaul projects. They showed the trouble generally across the country. The backing of the Washington government used for warlords is for the surety that the Afghan government will not have any full control by exercising power. The duty of warlords keeps up the control of private forces or else has recognized dominancy over domestic public security forces in their province. Warlords are disagreed with tax revenue to the central administration, mainly through their achievement of global 'charges' in border zones that they have controlled.

So, warlords sustained their local power and condition while raised their norms and values in a central setup. Provided that poppy farming, transportation trade, and growth support are the most dynamic substance of economic activity in the state. The warlords achieve a noteworthy portion like emergent a solid local financial elite that can help as a political correspondent to the war and supporter aimed at the rule of law. Karzai had seemed in his time to face up directly to warlords, while always had not taken any advantage.

Six of the most corrupt and violent warlord governors were plans, to fire in 2003 but the Karzai just get together them for a meeting in Kabul where he pressed them to return their tax profits to the Kabul administration and clear out their performances (Conrad, 2007). Loyally assured to modify their concert and at that point, most were gone back to establish their performance. On every occasion, Karzai assist withdraws by the American government in weakening to backing him in his efforts to punish the warlords handy to the US army. US legislators sequentially blame Karzai, endorsing that they had no choice but to support these dishonest governors for the reason that they were the men of Karzai the US continuously supported Karzai's government. Practically accomplishment of an understanding with the warlords helped the advantage of both Karzai and the US administration. Over time, the balance of power has transformed into the president.

The US President "Obama" said very clearly to contestants in the policy examination of 2009; "I not doing a long run struggle for nation-building about 10 years. I'm not want to spend trillions of dollars in a far region" (Vortre, 2011, p.215). That's why Obama lessened American determinations in his December 2009 talks to make better the aptitude of the Afghan state while not building the democracy of Afghan (Christine, 2010). Obama's administration has shown a readiness to effort with ethnic, provincial, and regional leaders which may estimate a substitution war policy of winning by supporting local warlords to contest the insurrection. Although Obama's government is probably to hold differences between backing for some of the most notorious warlords of Afghanistan and his new policy of falsifying cooperative relations. The forging supportive relationship with local ethnic leaders, the changing aspects of the relations in which the American payments to the militias to struggle with the Taliban on behalf of us, so they can easily estimate our current dealings with local warlords.

Over the interventions of the US in Afghanistan in all departments especially the ongoing peace talks along with the BSA agreement with the Afghan government many things can be impacted. The changing strategy of the US in Afghanistan has made the entire situation harsh, such US has started the procedure to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan along with NATO, here the impacts are visible to all which has made the increscent in suicide bombings

and badly impact the economy of Afghanistan, because the security is the backbone of every state to develop its economy and it will satisfy all investor to come and directly invest in the country, so due to harsh security situation even all those Afghan traders are not showing their optimism to invest in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the support of warlords in Afghanistan also made its impacts where it has made the ways to control corruption hard and still the government is facing this crucial problem, and for serving such a critical situation Afghan government requires full assistance from its international partners. All the above-mentioned aspects are considered as a problem for Afghanistan while talking over the peace talks are considered as deadlock for both Afghanistan and Taliban, now it's for sure that the Taliban and US have reached over a deal in Qatar but here the question arises that how it's possible for US alongside BSA which was signed with the Afghan government and now the US is not respecting the BSA and has signed a deal with Taliban, it would create further difficulties among Afghans, and for regional countries.

For better consequences, all parties are required all the international norms and values in their relationships with one another to respect and not to impact the sovereignty of a state.

The United States relied heavily on military means in Afghanistan that is a counter-insurgency offensive strategy. The counterinsurgency offensive does not work in achieving political objectives; that is to bring peace in Afghanistan and root out terrorism from the land. However, relying solely on the military has affected producing counter-political and military outcomes. For instance, the heavy use of drone attacks, indiscriminate killing of noncombatants, the conservative religious orthodoxy beliefs of local people against the foreign presence in their land, the dishonoring of women and old age people for search operations by army, night operations all resulted in the emergence of revenge factor among the local populace. The revenge factor appealed to the terrorist organizations and an increasing number of people took arms and coordinated offensive against the United States Army and more killing happened as a result. The sole use of counterinsurgency force by the United States has other major political implications as well.

Conclusion

When the war in Afghanistan started 19 years ago, the United States has absolute military advantages and can guarantee zero casualties and low casualties to win the war. Indeed, overthrowing the Taliban regime, not many U.S. personnel were killed or injured, because most of the tactics used by the U.S. attack were relatively airstrikes, use of advanced weaponry. Soon after, the U.S. military faced surprise attacks, explosions, and roadside bombs by the insurgent side. The security situation enormously deteriorated while having events of Landmines, the number of dead and injured is increasing day by day. In 2015, with the United States military withdrawal, the Afghan peace process begins to take its head.

The United States, the Afghan government, and the Afghan Taliban have been involved in an endless discussion for a possible peace settlement in Afghanistan. In the first half of 2015, people seem to feel that the Afghan peace process is finally dawning. Hopes for a solution to the Afghan war have shown hope. However, the news of the death of Taliban's chief Mullah Omar at the end of July 2015, gave a blow to the peace process. The Afghan government's negotiations with the Taliban were interrupted again, and the peace talks went into chaos. Soon coming into the office, the new leadership in the United States of America, Donald J. Trump tried to deeply engage in a talk with the Taliban once its enemy mediated by a host country Qatar. In negotiation with the Taliban, the United States has played an adverse role with the Afghan central government which is legitimate with any definition of international law. But power politics is tricky and makes one enemy into a friend.

In 2014 as part of the exit strategy, a major chunk of the United States Army had to withdraw from Afghanistan, and it did so. With the Obama administration's hasty withdrawal decision and transferring defense responsibilities to infant and less skillful Afghan National Army, the security situation once again begin to deteriorate. Massive civil and military casualties occurred during cross-counter attacks with insurgent groups and guerrilla war fighting. Afghan national army was not well equipped, trained, and skillful enough to counter insurgents and in return, Afghan national government power limited to Kabul and surrounding areas. Observing the deteriorating security situation and seeming Taliban's sway over large territories the United States turned away from previous rhetoric and begin to engage the Taliban in talks. As result, the peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan central government that has been actively promoted since the Obama administration reached an impasse and greatly suffered which resulted in a standoff of the Afghanistan peace process. The United States did not take into confidence the Afghan central government in talks with the Taliban nor other regional stakeholders. In Doha talks, the United States unilaterally accepted the Taliban as a legitimate stockholder in Afghanistan and promised to share power in Afghanistan in return for its withdrawal of troops without any security threat. Hence, the United States' role is once again said adverse, and directed towards its

interests while ignoring ground realities and regional actors' role. This will impact severe consequences for the region and will endanger Afghanistan's sacrifices in the so-called war on terror.

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