Self-expression values of Ethnicities (Study of Iran and Iraq Kurdish)

Yaaghob Ahmadi (PHD in Sociology)

Assistant Professor, Sanandaj Payam-E-Noor University Sociology Department Iran, Sanandaj

Anwar Shahmohamadi

Academic Member Humanities Department, Payame Noor University 19395-4697 Tehran, I.R. of Iran

Abstract

Democracy is a form of government in which all people have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. Ideally, this includes equal (and more or less direct) participation in the proposal, development and passage of legislation into law. Iran is one of the countries in which demand for democracy has been growing and is now widespread. Nevertheless, despite of great efforts by many members of the public, Iran has not made a successful transition to democracy. This paper examines political culture Ethnicities of Kurds (Iran, Iraq) and Fars (Iran) World Values Survey data (2005; 2007). Result show relatively similar strong emphasis on Emancipative value between Iranian Kurdish and Fars and also strong and meaningful deference between Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish. We don't found significant relationships between ethnicity and democratic political culture or Emancipative value.

Key word: Democracy, Political Development, Ethnicity, Political Culture, Emancipative value

1-INTRODUCTION

Since effective publication of Seymour Martin lipset, "the social prerequisites of democracy" (1959), researcher have debate and search about the causes of democratization. Today, most of the countries world, at least have become somewhat democratic, but democracy in many of them are still fragile and the number of countries that in which trying to establish democratic institutions or democracy have failed, are significant. No doubt in contemporary world, democratic political system as the undisputed political system is growing and although the expression of "End of History" (Fukuyama, 1991) may be exaggerated, but the reality is that the ideology of democracy as the ideal state ideology in the global arena is athlete.

"Third wave" of democracy with the collapse of undemocratic regimes in southern Europe, Spain, Portugal and Greece in 1970 and many regimes in Latin America and some Asian countries in 1980 and the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe in 1990, has unprecedented arisen. According to account of Freedom House, in 1997 from 191 countries, 117 countries have had democratic political regime, in 2004, according to the same center, 121 of the 193 countries have election or minimal democracy. In 2009, only 43 countries have introduced undemocratic. Accordingly, many scholars believe that democracy isn't predestined fate of all human beings, and it shall inevitable, not only in politics but also in the whole of intellectual life and cultural communities. Transition to democracy or democratization is affected by many factors that different researchers according to their theoretical orientation have cited to some of them; modernization, economic status, external pressure, including public policy networks, trust, trust in institutions and government institutions.

But in recent years and especially with the study of Almond and Verba (1963) "Civic Culture", a new subject has been added to issues of affecting the transition to democracy and it is political culture of societies in transition. Ever since Almond and Verba published their five-nation study, *The Civic Culture*, social scientists have sought to develop comparable survey data to study mass political attitudes in different societies. Ever since Almond and Verba's (1963) path breaking Civic Culture study, researchers of political culture have argued that mass values play an important role in strengthening democracy. Influential writers have claimed that trust, tolerance, and feelings of efficacy represent "civic virtues" that enable democratic institutions to function effectively (Lasswell, 1958; Sniderman, 1975; Putnam, 1993; Gibson, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998; Dalton, 2000; Newton, 200; Norris, 2002). Likewise, Eckstein (1966) and Eckstein et al. (1996) argued that a democratic system will become stable only if people have internalized democratic norms, and practice them in their daily relationships.

For most of these researchers, Like Almond and Verba (1965), political culture interprets as a subjective mass phenomenon that consists of orientations toward key objects of the political system and toward the individual's role in it. However, talk of democracy and democratization in Iran has one hundred year history. Although concern for democracy in Iran will return to the Mashroteh Revolution and after on the numerous historic opportunities for democratization has occurred in Iran, democracy had not been achieved. The process of Iranian society and Government to democracy has been spiral trend. From 2002 to 2009, freedom house report gave Iran a 6, both on rights and civil liberties and classifies it as "Undemocratic".

Moreover, Iran is multicultural society and divided based on ethnicity and religion and because of it; it has particular conditions for transition to democracy. So democratization in Iran need to special political culture. From this perspective, the topic of identity and ethnic identity as a "new dimension of politicized culture" (Malesevic2004) can be considered important. Thus the relationship between ethnicity and political culture can be considered as one of the important factors for transition to democracy in the Iranian society. Hence this article with study of typology of political culture of Kurds (in Iran and Iraq) and Fars (Iran) and the compared those, seek to answer of question of relation between ethnic identity and political culture. Accordingly, attention to detail and above, the present article seeks to answer these questions is:

- What is the rate of Similarity or difference of political culture of Kurds in Iran and Iraq?

- What is the rate of Similarities or differences between political Culture of Kurds and Fars in Iran? And finally: Which one is highlighting, the effect of national context or ethnic identity?

2. Literature

From the start, scholars of political culture have claimed that the functioning and survival of democratic institutions at the system level are closely linked with individual-level value orientations. From this perspective, the fate of a political system is largely determined by its people's political attitudes and value orientations. Aristotle in the fifth century B.C. and Montesquieu (1989 [1748]) argued that different forms of government reflect the kinds of virtues that prevail among people. Awareness of this insight re-emerged in explanations of the Nazi takeover in Weimar Germany, with many observers concluding that this disaster could be traced to the fact that Weimar was a "democracy without democrats" (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Almond and Verba (1963) launched the first comparative empirical survey of the mass attitudes linked with the stability and functioning of democracies. They concluded that a healthy mixture of "subject orientations" and "participant orientations" was conducive to a "civic culture" that helps democracies to flourish.

Larry Diamond argues in his book Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation that democracy should be viewed as a developmental phenomenon, because there 'is not now and has never been in the modern world of nation states a perfect democracy, one in which all citizens have roughly equal political resources and in which government is completely or almost completely responsive to all citizens' (Diamond 1999:18; cf. Dahl 1971:1-2). Diamond examines the process of democratic consolidation in numerous countries which are, after the 'third wave' of global democratization, above the threshold of electoral democracy. His attention is focused on political and cultural factors and civil society, but he refers also to economic structures and economic performance. Huntington blames culture for the failure of democracy in Muslim societies. He says that this 'failure has its source at least in part in the inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and society to Western liberal concepts' (Huntington 1996:114). Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson (2002) test several hypotheses about cultural effects by quantitative data and are able to show some significant connections, although they are skeptical about the strong claims concerning the macro consequences of values in the literature. They believe 'that cultural analysis has not arrived at any definitive findings, supported by strong empirical evidence, concerning cultural causality, at least not in relation to macro outcomes' (261-2, 302).

Most of the research above on political culture is based on the assumption that certain mass attitudes, such as support for democracy or civic trust, are crucial to democracy at the societal level. Nearly all of these studies hold that mass tendencies in individual-level attitudes and value orientations are important for the functioning of democracy at the system level. This assumption is the basic justification underlying research on political culture. In a paradigmatic Approach, we can distinguish three Approaches on political culture: the legitimacy approach or system-support approach); the communitarian approach or social capital approach and the human development approach or emancipative approach (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 572). Adherents of the legitimacy approach argue that mass support for democracy as a system of governance, and mass confidence in public institutions, provide democracies with the legitimacy that they need to operate effectively (Seligson, 2002).

Advocates of this approach consider democracy a limited set of institutional mechanisms that regulate official politics; the operation of democratic institutions is only loosely related to people's daily lives and does not require a public that has such virtues as tolerance and trust. These virtues have no immediate impact on the political institutions hovering above societies – which makes the requirements of institutional stability relatively modest: one does not need a highly civic public; it is sufficient that a majority has a fair amount of confidence in these institutions and prefers democracy to any alternative system of government. Two other approaches – the communitarian and the human development approach – follow the tradition of the civic culture school in arguing that democracy is more than a limited set of institutional mechanisms that regulate official politics. Accordingly, democracy is viewed in the perspective of Alexis de Tocqueville (1994 [1837]): as a system of government whose principles are practiced at the grass roots of society, involving citizens who experience and practice democratic norms in their daily lives. Consequently, making democracy work requires more than just having confidence in institutions and preferring democracy to alternative systems of government – it requires a broader set of civic values. The communitarian approach emphasizes those values that link the citizens to daily public life and strengthen their social ties and their loyalty to the community (Bell, 1993).

According to Putnam (1993; 2000) such communal orientations create social capital and are reflected in people's activities in voluntary associations and in their trust in their fellow citizens. Thus, communitarians and social capital theorists emphasize voluntary activity in associations and interpersonal trust as the communal ground on which democracies flourish (see Norris, 2002: chapter 8). Another school in the communitarian debate emphasizes the citizens' conformity to laws and their loyalty to rules of good conduct, or what they call "civic honesty" or "trustworthiness," as the moral resource that sustains and strengthens democracy (Rothstein, 2000). The human development approach shares with the communitarian approach the belief that civic values, rather than just specific orientations towards the political system and its institutions, are important for democracy. Human development theory is a theory of the societal conditions that restrict or widen people's choices. Democracy is a key one of these conditions. It institutionalizes civil and political liberties, providing people legal guarantees to make free choices in their private and public activities. And since human choice is at the heart of democracy, the civic values that make it work effectively are those that emphasize human choice – which we term self-expression values.

Thus, not all communal values and forms of social capital are equally important to democracy, but above all those that are motivated by people's aspiration for human freedom and choice. Self-expression values tap this dimension. With compile on revised version of modernization theory, Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues (2003; 2005; 2009) have emphasized on importance of Self-expression values for democracy, specially for effective democracy. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have argued that different stages of socioeconomic development shape different dimensions of culture. "Industrialization gives rise to one major process of cultural change, bringing bureaucratization and secularization. The rise of postindustrial society leads to a second major process of cultural change: instead of rationalization, centralization and bureaucratization, the new trend is toward increasing emphasis on individual autonomy and self-expression values" (p: 72). They believe that the shift from industrial to postindustrial values is eroding many of the key institutions of industrial society. In the political realm, the rise of postindustrial values brings declining respect for authority, and growing emphasis on participation and self-expression.

	Human Development		
Institutional Dimension	Cultural Dimension	Socioeconomic Dimension	
Democratization	Cultural Change	Modernization	Processes advancing Human Development
Civil And Political Liberties	Self-Expression Values	Socioeconomic Resources	Components of Human Development
Broadening people's entitlements to act according to their	Increasing people's priority to act according to their	Enhancing people's capabilities to act according to their	Contributions to Human Development
choices	choices	choices	Development
The I (An In	Underlying Theme		

.Table 1: The Process of Human Development

Source: (Inglehart and welzel, 2005: 45)

These trends are conducive to democratization in authoritarian societies – and to a more elite-challenging, issueoriented and direct form of democracy in already-democratic societies. In any case, rising self-expression values push for more genuine democracy. Self-expression values are inherently emancipative and people-centered; giving rise to a new type of humanistic society that promotes human freedom and autonomy on numerous fronts.

For Inglehart and Welzel, Self- experiment (Emancipative) values give priority to gender equality over patriarchy, tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority, and participation over security. Accordingly, for Inglehart and his colleagues, Self experiment values are crucial for democracy, especially effective democracy.

Q12	Autonomy chosen	=	
Q15	Imagination chosen	Indepen dence Index	
Q21	Obedience not chosen	nde der Ind	
Q19	Faith not chosen	I	
Q69	Priority to giving people more say in government Over Order and stable prices	trial SS	
Q70	Priority to giving people more say in local affairs over Strong defense and fighting crime	Postmatrial values	les
Q74	Priority to protecting freedom of speech over order and Stable prices	Pc	alu
Q61	Disagree that men better political leaders	a d	Self Experiment Values
Q62	Disagree education is more important for boys	Gend er Equa lity	ent
Q63	Disagree that men have more right to a job	0 H	
Q152	Disagree that governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor	ŷ	per
Q153	Disagree that Religious authorities interpret the laws.	A wareness of Democracy	EX
Q154	Agree that People choose their leaders in free elections.	100	elf
Q155	Disagree that People receive state aid for unemployment.	em	Š
Q156	Disagree that The army takes over when government is incompetent.	f D	
Q157	Agree that Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.	S 0	
Q158	Disagree that The economy is prospering.	nes	
Q159	Disagree that Criminals are severely punished.	Ire	
Q160	Agree that People can change the laws in referendums.	SW.	
Q161	Agree that women have the same rights as men.	A	
Q148	Disagree that having a strong leader	0 \$	
Q150	Disagree that having the army rule	e to	
Q151	Agree that having a democratic political system	bud	
Q151IQA	Disagree that having religious government	Attitude to democracy	

Table 2: Index of self experiment values

Source: Adapted from Inglehart and welzel, 2009

2.1. Ethnical- national Identity and Political Culture

Although the term 'ethnicity' has its roots in the Greek term *Ethnos/ethnikos* which was commonly used to describe pagans, that is non-Hellenic and, later, non-Jewish (Gentile) or non-Christian, second-class peoples, its academic and popular use is fairly modern. Sociologically speaking, the term was coined by D. Riesman in 1953 and it gained wider use only during the 1960s and 1970s (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). However, from its inception ethnicity has remained a 'hot potato' of sociology. Although the term was coined to make sense of a specific form of cultural difference, it acquired a rather different set of meanings. While the Anglo-American tradition adopted 'ethnicity' mostly as a substitute for minority groups within a larger society of the nation-state,2 the European tradition regularly opted to use ethnicity as a synonym for nationhood defined historically by descent or territory. At the same time both traditions shared a joint aim to replace what had become a popular, but heavily compromised (due to the Nazi experiment), concept of 'race'. Nevertheless, popular discourses, in both Europe and North America, have 'racialzed' the concept of ethnicity, that is 'race' was largely preserved (in its quasi-biological sense) and has only now been used interchangeably with 'ethnicity' (Malesevic, 2004: 2).

Furthermore, the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet-style federations along 'ethnic' lines, migrants to Western Europe, North America and Australia and globalization has relegated the term 'ethnic' to a quasi-legislative domain. Hence, the term 'ethnicity' often refers again to non citizens who inhabit 'our land', just as it did in the days of ancient Greece and Judea; that is, to second-class peoples.

However, it has been seen a sociological definition of ethnicity in Frederik Barth (1969) work in order to explain the power of cultural difference, both historically and geographically. He defined and explained ethnicity from the outside in: it is not the 'possession' of cultural characteristics that makes social groups distinct but rather it is the social interaction with other groups that makes that difference possible, visible and socially meaningful(Ibid: 3). After Bars, other various definitions from the modernist forms based on "melt furnaces" thesis to the theory of "ethnic awakening" and etc. has been proposed and today, newer definitions consider ethnicity generally in line with policy and political objectives. In the new world, the concept of ethnicity, more than any other category, has become the part of the political issues. In sociological expression, ethnicity, despite the diversity of definitions, has become the most recent example of the political culture.

In this view, two theories and consequently two groups of researchers are distinguished by integration between ethnicity and politics and especially integration ethnicity and political culture in multi-ethnic communities:

First group are those who emphasis that ethnicity isn't an important category to typology of political culture of individuals and so they have acknowledged on the importance of "national context and background" in the typology of political culture. From the beginning of the academic studies on political culture, important of large political units or country have been more than ethnicity and other domestic issues. Almond and Verba (1963) in their studies about political culture have compared political culture of five countries, U.S, Italy, West Germany, Mexico and Britain. The importance of this debate is more evident when reminded that their results are emphasized on impact of family, political awareness, national context and etc for political culture of countries, but they have no referred to ethnicity and ethnical context.

Ronald Inglehart and Christine Welzel also have emphasized on importance of large communities for political culture. Inglehart and Welzel (2005; 2009), have developed the theme of impact of "National Context", influencing values of the totality of countries on citizens political beliefs and attitudes. By National context, they want to refer to the intellectual atmosphere dominated in each community that leaves impact on political attitudes and beliefs of citizens. They mention that in all of societies, the dominant's social space that reflects current attitudes of mass society has important and significant effect on the formation of typology of political culture of citizens. This means that if a society's culture becomes more hostile to favoritism, corruption, and authoritarianism, people's culture is likely to do so as well.

Latter researchers have emphasized on integration of ethnicity and politic and in particular on the importance of ethnic identity for typology of political culture. William Resinger in a study of political culture as "the Renaissance of political culture" (1995) claimed that future researches on political culture should focus their attention on major sub-cultures from different groups within communities. In other words, he believes that the type of political culture in multiethnic and multicultural societies is determined by ethnic and cultural identity of citizens. Debate on Subculture, specifically about attitudes and beliefs, returns to studies of David Alkins and Richard Simon (1974, 1980). In study about results of the Canadian election, they concluded that the state boundaries based on ethnic characteristics have been drawn, are sustainable and effective boundaries that have more effect on beliefs and attitudes of people. They extended his theory with proposition of "small world" idea.

Brian Silver and Kathleen M. Dooley (1998, 2000) also in study of political culture devote a particular importance for the subject and category of ethnicity. They address that "Most analyses of political culture have assumed the existence of a *national*, i.e., society-wide, political culture. To ascribe a political culture to a society implicitly assumes that the members of a society share some common attitudes and values. However, the assumption of common values is often better met by ethnic groups than by the aggregate population of an entire country" (p: 51). In this way, they mention "Ethnic identifications are a principal alternative to national affiliations and the most likely source of systematic within-country variation in political culture" (Ibid: 52). Thus, they conclude "The level of agreement on basic political values by members of different ethnic groups in multiethnic societies may be critical to the functioning of democratic institutions and to the process of democratization in transition countries" (Ibid: 58). Ailsa Henderson (2007; 2009) has emphasized on importance of state-ethnic boundaries for political culture. Rejecting comparison of political culture of countries, she stressed that it can be separated based on type of political culture and ethnic – state relation in Canada, nine cultural types (2007: 596). She believes that local borders are better explanation of political culture than national context.

On this basis and with regard to issues proposed in the theoretical and empirical studies, it can be discovered two mutual and somewhat contradictory ideas: first idea emphasizes on the impact and importance of national context and metropolitan areas for beliefs and attitudes of the ordinary people; second emphasizes on the importance of other subcultures and especially the boundaries of ethnicity on attitudes. Accordingly, Original hypothesis of the present document are:

- is national identity important Factor for political culture (self-experiment values)? In other word, is there significant difference between self-experiment values of Kurds and Fars in Iran?

- does Ethnic identity affect political culture (self-experiment values) of Kurds in Iraqi and Iran and so isn't there significant difference between self-experiment values of Kurds?

				Age group of Res= v 237				
Sex=	Group of		No	16-29	30-49	50 to	total	
v235	respondents		Ans	10-27		up		
	Fars (Iran)	Count		9	6	2	17	
	Tais (Itali)	⁷ Of total		45.0	30.0	10.0	85.0	
	Kurds(Iran)	Count		2	0	1	3	
No	Kulus(Itali)	% Of total		10.0	0.0	5.0	15.0	
answer	Kurds(Iraq)	Count						
	Kulus(liaq)	% Of total						
	total	Count		11	6	3	20	
	totai	% Of total		55.0	30.0	15.0	100	
	Eara (Iron)	Count	2	369	267	114	752	
	Fars (Iran)	% Of total	2.0	35.7	25.5	11.0	72.7	
	Vurda(Iron)	Count	0	60	31	11	102	
Male	Kurds(Iran)	% Of total	0.0	5.8	3.0	1.1	9.9	
Wale	Kurds(Iraq)	Count	0	54	87	40	181	
		% Of total	0.0	5.2	8.4	3.9	17.5	
	total	Count	2	483	385	165	1035	
	totai	% Of total	2.0	46.7	37.2	15.9	100.0	
Female -	Ears (Iron)	Count	5	338	334	80	757	
	Fars (Iran)	% Of total	5.0	32.5	32.1	7.7	72.5	
	Kurds(Iran)	Count	0	47	31	2	80	
	Kulus(Itali)	% Of total	0.0	4.5	3.0	0.2	7.7	
	Kurds(Iraq)	Count	0	85	84	34	203	
	Kulus(IIaq)	% Of total	0.0	8.2	8.1	3.3	19.5	
	total	Count	5	470	449	116	1040	
	iotai	% Of total	5.0	45.2	43.2	11.2	100.0	

Table 3 : Distribution of sample based on Sex, Age group, Nationality and Ethnicity

3. Methodology

3.1. Data

The data used for answering the main research question and testing hypotheses are from World Values Survey. This wave of the survey has been implemented during the years 2005 to 2009, among different countries including Iran and Iraq. The survey sample in Iraq has been 2701, and in 2007 for Iran 2667. According to recorded accountability ethnicity, about 384 samples for Iraqi Kurds, 185 of Iranian Kurds and 1526 for Fars has been used. The sample distribution according to nationality and ethnicity, gender and age group has been reported in Table (3).

3.2. Definition of Concept

3.2.1. Self-expression (Democratic Political Culture)

Inglehart and Welzel refer to Self-expression values as values give priority to gender equality over patriarchy, tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority, and participation over security. Self-expression values reflect an emancipative and humanistic ethos, emphasizing human autonomy and choice. Self-expression values emphasize tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life (2009: 130). Accordingly, self-expression values make people more supportive of individual liberties and human rights. Self-expression values have an anti-discriminatory and humanistic tendency. This gives these values a largely pro-civic character.


In fact, self-expression values prove to be more strongly linked with democracy than any other factor, including variables that figure prominently in the literature on democratization such as interpersonal trust, associational membership and socioeconomic development (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 231). So, the inherently emancipative nature of self-expression values makes democracy increasingly likely to emerge.


3.2.2. Ethnicity

Although the term 'ethnicity' has its roots in the Greek term Ethnos/ Ethnikos, which was commonly used to describe pagans, that is non-Hellenic and, later, non-Jewish (Gentile) or non-Christian, second-class peoples, its academic and popular use is fairly modern. Sociologically speaking, the term was coined by D. Riesman in 1953 and it gained wider use only during the 1960s and 1970s (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). However, from its inception ethnicity has remained a 'hot potato' of sociology. Although the term was coined to make sense of a specific form of cultural difference, it acquired a rather different set of meanings. While the Anglo-American tradition adopted 'ethnicity' mostly as a substitute for minority groups within a larger society of the nation-state,2 the European tradition regularly opted to use ethnicity as a synonym for nationhood defined historically by descent or territory. At the same time both traditions shared a joint aim to replace what had become a popular, but heavily compromised (due to the Nazi expression), concept of 'race'. Nevertheless, popular discourses, in both Europe and North America, have 'racialized' the concept of ethnicity, that is 'race' was largely preserved (in its quasi-biological sense) and has only now been used interchangeably with 'ethnicity'.

3.3. Model on Measurement and validity of Index

In this study, model of measurement of main index, self-expression (E-values) contain six latent variables that in addition to main index include Autonomy, Gender Equality, Awareness of Democracy, Attitude to Democracy and Postmatrial variables. Although postmatrial index is a latent variable, but because we hadn't access to its measures, we used of last score had proposed by World values Survey and because of this, in model of this study, it introduce as observed variable (y002n).





As in the previous sections have been described, this model has a theoretical basis. Some partial indicators defined in Table (1), have no data for at least one of the three study groups and therefore they have been removed of model measurements.

Also, because of the low factor loadings, some measures related to knowledge about democracy have been excluded from the model. It was the important point For research group, whether the model developed in the three study groups and also the total sample shall be approved by experimental data or not? If the answer to above question will positive or largely positive, it could be compare groups by quantity data. Therefore, fitting parameters for the entire four state models and also a significant difference between the estimated factor loadings with a value of zero for the total population studied was investigated and evaluated. The results of evaluation of whole measurement of developed model have been reported in Table (4).

	developed 1 Df= 90	Index	Type of index		
Fars(Iran)	Kurd (Iran)	Acronyms			
0/933	0/808	0/882	0/922	CFI	
0/916	0/760	0/853	0/903	TLI	comparative
0/727	0/528	0/683	0/727	PNFI	
0/746	0/646	0/706	0/738	PCFI	frugal
0/041	0/064	0/094	0/049	RMSEA	
0/973	0/904	0/865	0/965	GFI	
0/961	0/863	0/809	0/951	AGFI	a ha a huda
340/22	168/19	418/00	571/65	Chi-Square	absolute
0/000	0/000	0/000	0/000	P-Value]

Table (4): fitting index of basic Model and improved Model

All calculated indices of fitting (Table 4) in two group of comparative and frugal indices that are the main criteria for evaluating model are in an acceptable range or close to it. Considering the complexity of developed model in terms of frequency of indices defined for each structure and that is model is the secondary developed model, such a situation shows good condition. Overall, it can be concluded that collected data in total and also for each sub-group studied support of the theoretical developed models for measuring the structure Self-expression values. Such support interprets as Structural Validity of the developed model. It is very important that the loading factors and gamma coefficients in a secondary factor model that are known as the most important parameters, at least, statistically have been meaningful difference with zero. Thus, equality of parameters with zero as sets of zero hypotheses was tested. Results showed that all the free parameters defined as the loading factor or gamma coefficient are significantly different from zero. The detailed results have reflected in table (5).

Table (5): Standard and Nonstandard estimates for the parameters of Gamma and Lambda and Test of equality of parameters with zero

The most important free and constant parameters in model (regression weights)			Estimation		S.Error	Critical	P-Value	
Parameter	path			Standard	Nonstandard		Ratio	
	Independence	Ļ	E_Values	.207	.029	.009	3.342	.000
	G_Equality	Ļ	E_Values	.270	.074	.025	2.994	.003
γ	D_Awareness	Ļ	E_Values	.412	.851	.082	10.323	.000
,	D_Attitude	t	E_Values	.877	.487	.045	10.842	.000
	Y002n	t	E_Values	.248	.147	.019	7.834	.000
	Q12	Ļ	Independence	.283	1.000	Reference variable		able
	Q15	Ļ	Independence	.231	.670	.132	5.082	.000
	Q19	t	Independence	.582	1.970	.476	4.137	.000
	Q21	t	Independence	.160	.552	.137	4.020	.000
	Q61	t	G_Equality	.340	1.000	Reference variable		able
	Q62	t	G_Equality	.984	3.371	1.055	3.196	.001
	Q154	Ļ	D_Awareness	.790	1.000	Reference variable		able
	Q155	Ļ	D_Awareness	.719	.958	.031	31.391	.000
10	Q157	Ļ	D_Awareness	.639	.858	.032	27.128	.000
	Q158	t	D_Awareness	.745	.968	.031	31.730	.000
	Q159	Ļ	D_Awareness	.611	.842	.033	25.747	.000
	Q160	ţ	D_Awareness	.610	.842	.032	26.371	.000
	Q148	t	D_Attitude	.555	1.000	Reference variable		able
	Q150	ţ	D_Attitude	.521	.869	.091	9.592	.000
	Q151	t	D_Attitude	.463	.592	.058	10.177	.000

3.4. Analysis of Mean Structures and Test of Main Research Hypotheses

Analysis of Mean Structure is based on comparing the relative differences of mean. In this way, for comparing between groups, mean of one of group assumed constant equals zero and the mean of another group is calculated in compared with. That group is a reference variable that mean of it can be fixed with zero (Byrne, 2010).




Figure 2: Developed Model to analyze mean structures of Kurds of Iraq

The result of the analysis of mean structures is in harmony with the main hypothesis in this study. Based on the theory in literature, it expected that the Iranians, regardless of Kurdish or Persian, had has more similarities with each other in relation to the tendency to Self-expression values, While two Kurds' group will have less than similarities. The results of developed model (figure 2) are summarized in the table below:

P-Value	C.R.	S.E.	Relative Difference of Means	Comparing Groups
		Fixed equal with zero	Kurds (Iraq)	
			for Iraqi Kurds	
0/000	9/813	0/352	+3/454	Kurds (Iran)
		Fixed equal with zero for	Kurds (Iran)	
			Iranian Kurds	
0/000	4/990	0/210	+1/048	Fars (Iran)

Table 6: Estimation of Relative difference between studied groups and significance of those

The most important results show that:

• Tendency of Kurds in Iraq and Iran to Self-expression values is significantly different. While the mean score is zero for Iraqi Kurds, Mean positive for Iranian Kurds is indicated that Iranian Kurds has more positive trends to host this kind of value.

• Tendency of Iranian Kurds and Fars to Self-expression values also are significantly different. Here, Iranian Fars has few more tendencies to Self-expression values than Iranian Kurds.

• Despite a significant difference between Kurd and Fars of Iran, this difference is not considered serious. However the difference between Iraqi Kurds and Iranian Kurds is significantly high.

200

4. Conclusion

As Inglehart rightly point out "culture plays a much more crucial role in democracy than the literature of the past two decades would indicate" (Vanhanen, 2003: 13). As in literature explained, although deferent social scientists have focused on political culture from deferent viewpoints, but all of them emphasize on important role of political culture for transition to democracy and especially for consolation of it. Christopher Clargue *et al.* (2001:36–7) argue on the basis of their empirical study that 'the probability of democracy in the postwar period is strongly affected by country characteristics that reflect cultural and institutional inheritances.' They emphasize that British colonial influence, island status, and a relatively low degree of ethnic fragmentation have been conducive to democracy, whereas Muslim heritage has had a negative effect on the probability of democracy. The advocates of 'Asian values' have attempted to explain the lack of political freedom in some Asian countries by Asian cultural traditions which are said to emphasize community over individualism, to favor authoritarianism, and to include preponderance towards strong and stable leadership rather than political pluralism (see Inoguchi and Newman 1997; Khong 1997).

So, analyzing World values Survey data and focusing on Self-expression values index for measuring democratic political culture, this article studied situation of Kurdish (Iran and Iraq) and Fars (Iran) about democratic political culture. Results of analysis shown that mean of Self-expression values index of Iranian Kurds are more than Iraqi Kurds. This is mean that tendency of Iranian Kurdish to Self-expression values has bee more that of Iraqi Kurds. Moreover, there was significance difference between tendency of Iranian Kurds and Fars to Self-expression values and result shown that Iranian Fars has acquired a few high score from Kurds. This results confirm debates of Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart and Welzel (2005; 2009), Diammond (1999) and others about effect of National context on political culture. Althogh, results almost confirm the thesis of significance relation between effect of Ethnic context and political culture, in particular in multiethnic societies.

References

- Almond, G.A. "Democratization 1992 'Crisis, Choice, and Change'," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba .1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes in Five Western Democracies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bell, Daniel. 1993. *Communitarians and Its Critics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Byrne, B. M. (2010). Structural equation modeling with Amos. New York: Rutledge.
- Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, Larry (1999) Developing Democracy toward Consolidation, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, Larry. 2003. "How People View Democracy: Findings from Public Opinion Surveys in Four Regions."
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2000. "Social Capital." In Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books, pp. 99–111.
- Gibson, James L. 1997. "Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991: Collective Action, Rational Choice, and Democratic Values." *American Political Science Review* 91 (September): 671–84.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Inoguchi, T. and Newman, E. (1997) "Introduction: 'Asian Values' and Democracy in Asia," in "Asian Values" and Democracy in Asia, Tokyo: The United Nations University
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2003. "Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing the Cross-level Linkages." *Comparative Politics* 36 (October): 61–79.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2009 Political Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value Change, Oxford University press: 126-143.
- Khong, C.O. (1997) "Asian Values: the Debate Revisited," in "Asian Values" and Democracy in Asia, Tokyo: The United Nations University.
- Malesevic, Senisa 2004 Sociology of Ethnicity, Sage Publication Ltd, London.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rothstein, Bo. 2000. "Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories." Journal of Theoretical Politics 12 (4): 477-501.
- Seligson, Mitchell. 2002. "The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological Fallacy," *Comparative Politics* 34 (April): 273–92.
- Silver, B. D., and Titma, M. (1998). Support for new political institutions in Estonia: the effects of nationality, citizenship, and material well-being. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 45, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.), 37-47.
- Silver, B. D and Titma, M. (2000). Measuring Political Culture in Multiethnic Societies, *New Directions in Comparative Politics*. New York: West view Press, pp. 61-72.
- Vanhanen, Tatu. 2003. Democratization: A Comparative Analysis of 170 Countries. London: Rutledge.