Qui Adheret Deo Unus Spiritus Est: The Discursive Role of the Body Metaphor in Pascal's Pensées – A Study

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Abstract

This paper presents an attempt to make an in-depth analysis of the body metaphor in Blaise Pascal's apologetic work Pensées. The study focused on the body metaphor elaborated in fragments 474 to 485, and it aimed at (1) analyzing its structure within the framework of Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT); (2) examining its role in the creation of coherence within the text; and (3) place it within 17th century philosophical and religious context. The CMT analysis implies that this particular occurence of the body metaphor in Pensées constitutes a fundamental building block in establishing the persuasive power and coherence of the text. Also, its structure corresponds to Pascal's theory on the role of the body in cognition. As to the larger cultural context, it can be concluded that the metaphor fits into the dominating Extended Great Chain of Being model of the era.

keywords: Jansenism; Pascal; CMT; body metaphor; discourse

Introduction

The present study seeks to analyze and interpret the role of the body metaphor in establishing coherence to the discourse in Blaise Pascal's pro-jansenist work *Pensées* (published posthumously in 1669). *Pensées* is frequently viewed as the most forceful apologetic writing of the Jansenist movement, presenting a strong and overwhelming rhetorics to defend St. Augustine's (354-430) principles of true faith. Analyses in the subject have concluded that it is Pascal's structuration of discourse and genuine use of language that give *Pensées* its exceptional persuasive power (e.g. Le Guern, 1969; Descotes, 1976; Parker, 2013). In his recent book, Parker (2013) attributes an important role to metaphors in the realization of Pascal's pragmatic intentions, and he even provides a brief interpretation of two of them, namely, the body metaphor and the bad seedsmetaphor. Although successful in detecting the metaphors and their place in the larger context, Parkerdoes not go on to examine them in a broader linguistic and cultural framework. The purpose of this paper is, indeed, to make an in-depth analysis of the body metaphor in *Pensées*, based on the Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT) developed by Lakoff and Johnson in 1980. My aim was twofold: on the one hand, I wanted to uncover the motivation and the correspondences in Pascal's body metaphor in order to establish its conceptual structure. On the other hand, I made an attempt to place the metaphor in its immediate (Jansenism) and in its broader (17th Western religion) cultural context, thereby pointing out how it contributes to coherence in discourse within the work itself, and within the larger religious discourse of 17th century literature.

1. On Jansenism (based on Maire, 1998)

Jansenism was a religious movement in the 17th and 18th centuries. It was Cornelius Jansen's work entitled *Augustinus* (1640) that marked the beginning of the Jansenist movement in an era where the continuous reforms of the Catholic Church divided the clergy and the believers.

In its very essence, Jansenism advocated St Augustine's (354-430) principles of divine grace in the process of salvation: that is, human beings are lost, malicious and incapable of experiencing God *unless* they are accorded the irrefutable divine grace or *grâce efficace*, which guarantees that the individual partakes in God's plan and does not turn to earthly pleasures. Not all individuals are given the grâce efficace, though, and the left-outs are doomed for eternal blindness, letting themselves controlled by their own feeble will. Volition is, in fact, the key term of Jansenist doctrine: those who have received the divine grace subordinate themselves to God's will, the only true way to salvation. Similarly to Calvin's philosophy of predestination, Jansenism provides a rather saturnine vision of human existence and denies the notion of free will *(libre arbitre)*. Furthermore, it goes against mainstream Catholic, in particular Jesuit,doctrines, mitigating the Church's influence on salvation and other cardinal theological questions. Almost immediately after its publication, Jansen's *Augustinus* becomes subject of a heated and prolongated religious quarrel, which continues up to the second half of the 18th century. As Michel Le Guern (2003) puts it, the conflict between Jansenists and the Jesuits (to be more precise, Molinists) was more an issue of personal and poitical interests than a difference in theological viewpoints. It was, indeed, Cardinal Richelieu's (1585-1642) antipathy towards Jansen and his French advocates – Saint Cyran, Bérulle, Pierre Nicole, and the Arnauld family – that resulted in the condemnation of *Augustinus*. Richelieu feared that if Jansen's "heretic" ideas on grace and salvation were spread, the influence of the Church would decline, thus destabilizing Louis XIII's (1601-1643) position as a Catholic Monarch. With relatively short periods of peace, the quarrel continued and escalated in Pope Clement XI's (1649-1721) issuing of the bull *Unigenitus* in 1713, condemning 101 points in the Jansenist Pasquier Quesnel's interpretation of the New Testament[1]. Following *Unigenitus*, the Jansenist community diverged into three sub-movements, and gradually disappeared by the end of the 18th century.

Nevertheless, the period following *Augustinus* produced some remarkable apologetic literature, most notably, the work of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). A renowned scientist and a fervent port royalist, Pascal first defended Jansenism in *Les Provinciales*, a series of fictitious letters written and published in Paris between 1656 and 1657. *Pensées*, his other influential work, was compiled from his notes and published posthumously in 1669. Numerous editions of the work have been published, including Brunschvicq (1897), Lafuma (1935) and Mesnard (1976).

Structurally, *Pensées* is a fragmentary work, and the polyphony of its discourse has been in the centre of research in literature ever since. Pascal's ability to persuade and, in Descotes' words (1976), to eliminate and reconstruct the reader's identity by continuously refuting and recycling ideas, makes *Pensées* the reflection *par excellence* of Augustinism: declaring that solely God's word is reasonable and irrefutable, it rules out the possibility of free will and independent thinking. Descotes goes on to say that, in contrast to Descartes, Pascal's argumentative strategy follows a serpentine logic (*Ibid.*, Introduction: 22), and this makes it possible for him to switch from one perspective to an other, on one occasion arguing for something only in order to cast it off some pages later. It is exactly this apparent inconsistency that gives the impression of *Pensées* being a fragmentary and incomplete work; at a closer look, however, it becomes clear that Pascal was very logical and systematic in his argumentation and organization of his apology. Indeed, *Pensées* is, on the one part, a reflection of Pascal's scientific, theological and philosophical work (*Ibid.*, 14). On the other part, Pascal's argumentation is made up of the polyphony of different discourses; that is to say, he amalgated all courants of contemporary philosophy and theology in order to produce his own discourse (*Ibid.*, 17). Anti-cartesian by principle, Pascal refuses the possibility of reaching absolute certainty in cognition, and, just as in his scientific method, he proceeds as an empirist in constructing his apology: he listens to and contemplates on all discourses, be it the molinist propaganda or the layman's opinion. He then combines the elements that serve his persuasive campaign in a way that it becomes impossible for the reader not to admit the verity of Augustinism. In other words, Pascal creates a synthesis of discourses which, viewed from any angle of interpretation, can only verify his right . Approaching the same issue from a principally philosophical viewpoint, Pavlovits (2014: 10) contends that Pascal has a perspectival conceptualization to truth; that is to say, the truth value of anything depends on the perspective one examines it from. Different as they may be, these (seemingly) conflicting angles will converge at one point and will conciliate with each other. Pavlovits (*Ibid.*) justly believes that this logic resides in Pascal's being a mathematician, more precisely, a geometer – his work in this field reflects the same perspectival thinking to geometrical problems.

Besides its organization, the cogency of Pascal's argumentation resides in its genuine use of language, with strong emphasis on imagery and metaphor.

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[1]Le Nouveau Testament en français avec des *réflexions morales(1693)*

Le Guern (1969) explains that metaphors are the engine of Pascal's work, for they ease the "enchainment of ideas" (1969: 240) , continuously leading the reader to reach the only logical conclusion of his reasoning. Le Guern (*Ibid.,* 145) proposes that with his intricate use of metaphors, Pascal created a "new relationship between representation and the reality represented"[2], providing the reader with a suggestive imagery. Parker (2013) made a discourse-level analysis of Pascal's work to explain how his language use contributed to the power *Pensées* exercises on the reader. Parker analyzed the relationship between *reason*, *will* (or 'volition': how one acts depends on whether the individual receives the grâce efficace) and *desire* (our natural disposition or instinct), and concluded that there was a link of causality between these three psychological components (2013: 54): conflict occurs when will is too strongly influenced by desire, therefore overriding reason; the only amenable way to reaching happiness is to receive the grâce efficace, and with that a volition that follows God's will, abandoning all earthly desires. As long as the individual does not realize that they partake in God's plan, they will yield to their instinct and unconsciously rebel against the divine system. As Parker (*Ibid.*, 55) points out, the dependence between human will and this system is neatly outlined in Pascal's elaboration of the body metaphor, running from fragment 474 to 485 (found in Section VII entitled Morality and Doctrine in Brunschvicq's edition). Parker makes, indeed, a logical interpretation of the metaphor, and explains how it strengthensthe persuasion mechanism of Pensées. He does not, however, relates it to the larger socio-cultural context of the era; in other words, he does not go on to explain how Pascal's body metaphor fits into and reinforces the prevailing Catholic discourse of the 17th century. In an attempt to make an in-depth analysis of this body metaphor within the text, and to be able to place it within itsgeneral religious and philosophical context, I will now introduce the notion of conceptual metaphor as defined by Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) Cognitive Metaphor Theory (henceforth CMT). The principles of CMT are briely outlined in the next section.

2. The Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT)

CMT (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) is the founding theory of today's dynamically developing interdisciplinary approach called Cognitive Linguistics (CL)[3]. In its essence, CL studies how meaning is created, communicated, and reflected in human behaviour (Kövecses & Benczes, 2010: 13). It aims as integrating various domains of science – including Linguistics, Literature, Computer Science and Psychology – in order to obtain an as accurate definition of meaning as possible. Now, the contribution of CMT to the field is its assumption that human thought is fundamentally metaphorical: our mind understands abstract concepts through what we draw from physical reality (*Ibid.*, 79-80). That is to say, our conceptualization of ourselves and of the world is to a great extent determined by spatio-temporal experience, and largely builds on image-schematic representations of entities. Some elements of concrete concepts are highlighted and utilized to facilitate access to the elements of the abstract concept.

To illustrate this process, take the expression *the heart of the problem* (author's own example): it interprets as *the centre or the most important part* of a given problem. The organ *heart* is, both anatomically and functionally, the central component of the human body. Now, the human anatomical architecture is mentally equated with the structure of a problem, and this analogy linguistically surfaces in the form of the expression *the heart of the problem*. This relationship can be defined in the conceptual metaphor THE IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL[4] (e.g., Kövecses & Benczes, 2010: 135). In the terminology, the abstract frame is the *target domain*, and the more concrete one is the *source domain*. These denominations reflect the logical relationship between the components of metaphor.

The above example demonstrates how much the physical is embedded in thought and, therefore, in language. All this implies that metaphors are not limited to literary creation, but they make up a significant proportion of everyday language.

The prosaic and the poetic are not, consequently, very far from each other: indeed, the majority of literary metaphors are based on the same conceptual metaphors as everyday language use (Kövecses, 2005: 49).

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[2] "[la] création d'un nouveau rapport entre représentation et la réalité representée" (1969: 145)(English translations by the author of this paper)

[3] For a thorough introduction to CL in English, see, for example, Ungerer, F., Schmid, H-J. 2006. An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics. London: Routledge or Geeraerts, D (ed.).2008. Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings. Mouton de Gruyter. For an introduction to CMT in English, see Kövecses, Z.2010.Metaphor: A Practical Introduction. Oxford: OUP.

[4] In CMT, conceptual metaphors are always typed in small capitals

The difference is that poetic language creates novel expressions that are often alien to colloquial language use, but, when traced back, it turns out that the conceptual motivation is the same.

Inwhat concerns the implementation of the theory in literature, the broad subfield that deals with CL and CMT analyses is *cognitive poetics*. In accordance with the principles of its discipline, cognitive poetics defines literature as a "specific form of human experience and […] cognition" (Gavins, 2003: 1), which are to be sought in the forms of linguistic and cognitive processing of the human mind (*Ibid.*, 2). In other words, our experience of the world will directly influence our interpretation of a text – it is this principle that has called into being the intersection of literature and social sciences. CMT-related research in literature and in discourse mostly examines the role of conceptual metaphors in creating intratextual (within-text) or intertextual (several texts within a larger discourse) coherence (see, for example, Kövecses, 2005: 285). Owing to its interdisciplinary nature, CMT carries the potential to give discourse interpretations that view the the subject from multiple prespectives, drawing conclusions from the intertwining of the linguistic, the cultural and the social.

3. Analysis

3.1 The Role of the Human Body in Pascalian Philosophy

Before presenting the actual CMT analysis, it is indispensable to spare some words on Pascal's concept of the importance of the body in human cognition; I believe that the perspective he presents in relation to this question did have an influence on his contruction of the body metaphor in *Pensées*, and its manifestations can be identified in his argumentation. Pavlovits (2014: 26-38) provides a concise summary of the literature relevant to Pascal's philosophy on the body. In Pascalian theory, sense perception – what we can learn and experience with our senses – is, *per definitionem*, the primary source of cognition. This principle is similar to mathematical axiomsas it is evident to common sense. Its certainty, therefore, cannot be doubted in any way: it suffices to accept it. This line of reasoning is in sharp contrast with Descartes' view on cognition: in his philosophy, the reliability of senses is often questioned and suspended (*Ibid.*, 27). That is to say, Descartes doubted the certainty of cognition and belief based on one's own assumptions, especially if it is tied to physical reality – this is the Cartesian or hyperbolic doubt, the foundation of methodological skepticism. Indeed, Pascal also reckons that our senses may be deceptive, but he quickly adds that they should not be unnecessarily questioned provided that our perception is, so to say, 'supervised' by rational thinking. With the body placed in the focus of cognition, Pascal discards metaphysics in cognition, and attributes a double, at the same time positive and negative, role to the body in the process (Pavlovits, 2014: 27-28).

Pascal argues that our basic ideas and the general truths[5] about time, space and movement come from nature, more precisely, from the human body; it is through our bodily experience that our mind conceptualizes the world around us. Nevertheless, the connection between body (*le corps*) and mind (*l'esprit*) is not direct: information is transmitted through the heart (*le coeur*), which, by generating feelings, makes the body accessible to the rational mind (*Ibid.*, 31). By elevating it to a central position, Pascal, as Carraud (1992 [In: *Ibid.,* 31]) puts it, defines the heart as the "spirit's mode of being within the body".

Now, if the body and the mind interact in cognition (or, in CL terms: the creation of meaning), then it logically follows that cognition is a complex phenomenon, where the physical and the intellectual are mixed (*Ibid.*, 35). Pascal concludes that, in this respect, the body has a negative role in our conceptualization of the world because the physical hinders the realization of purely intellectual matters. It is, therefore, the complexity of human beings that prevents perfect understanding (*Ibid.*). Again, this line of reasoning contradicts Descartes' ideas, who does not see this dualism as a negative factor in cognition.

As it will be seen from the following section,Pascal's metaphor of the human body overlaps with the logic explained above at several places, particularly because it places God in the centre of the process of salvation, identifying him as the heart of the system.

3.2 The Abstract Complex System is the Human BodyMetaphor in Pascal's Rhetoric

"To regulate the love which we owe to ourselves, we must imagine a body full of thinking members, for we are members of the whole, and must see how each member should love itself, etc."[6]

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[5] Pavlovits (2014: 30) makes reference to Pascal's theory on the nature of ideas as explained in *De l'Esprit géométrique* (*On the geometrical spirit*, 1657/58)
[6] English source text published by E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1958.

– starts Pascal his argumentation for the unity of God and his people, in fragment 474. Up to fragment 485, the discourse is based on the extension of THE ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE HUMAN BODY metaphor, more precisely, the simple metaphor THE STRUCTURE OF AN ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN BODY. This metaphor originates in our experience of the body being a system having an organized and logical structure. While this metaphor, being tightly connected to physical reality, can be considered universal, its presence in *Pensées* may be particularly relevant with regard to the era's religious, philosophical and scientific context: on the one hand, the dominating orthodox Catholic discourse builds on the Great Chain of Being, a metaphorical conceptualization of the hierarchical organization of entities in the universe (Kövecses, 2010: 152-157). On the other hand, the dichotomy of body and soul is a question of particular importance in 17th century French philosophy, notably because of Descartes' dualist perspective, which, as mentioned above, suggests the mutual influence of body and mind on each other, thereby challenging Judeo-Christian traditions.

In the Great Chain of Being model (Kövecses, 2010: 152-157), animate and inanimate entities are organized according to the hierarchy established by human society, explicitly present since the beginnings of Christianity. On the top of the pyramid are humans, who represent a higher-order mode of existence. Next are animals, characterized by their instinctual behaviour. Animals are followed by plants, which can be described only in biological terms; the two lowest places in the hierarchy are occupied by complex objects and natural physical things. In the model, complex objects have structural attributes and functional properties.

Although the above repartition may seem rigid, it is actually not possible to conceptualize any of the levels without relying on the others; that is, we use the lower-level entities to understand the higher ones, and vica versa (*Ibid.,* 152-153). Probably, the most common example for this phenomenon is the metaphor HUMAN IS ANIMAL, referring to "animal-like" instinctual behaviour and reflected in, for instance, our tendency to call dishonest people 'swine' or 'vermin'. In the Great Chain of Being model, any level can serve as the source domain or the target domain of a metaphor – the relation between them is bidirectional. Lakoff and Turner (1989, [in: Kövecses, 2010: 156]) define a chain model that broadens its scope to a larger sphere of entities, called the Extended Great Chain of Being (henceforth EGCB). The EGCB places God, the universe, and human society over humans, reflecting Judeo-Christian ideologies of power relations. Now, each level in the EGCB hierarchy defines a general metaphor with a number of complex metaphors. In order to explain the logic behind THE ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE THE HUMAN BODY, it is indispensable to take a brief look at the complex systems metaphor first.

The complex systems metaphor (*Ibid.*, p.155) uses the complex object level as source domain of the EGCB to explain abstract systematic organizations, ranging from the smallest (e.g., the human mind) to the most extended ones (e.g., society, economic and political systems, relationships). Mappings between the source and the target domain include the function, the stability, the development and the condition of the abstract concept – aspects that are of primary importance in the case of a concrete system with physical dimensions. The most common source domains in this set are machines, buildings, plants and the human body or part(s) of the human body. These domains often overlap with one another, but as the present paper focuses on Pascal's use of THE ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE HUMAN BODY metaphor, the other three source domains will not be subject to description.

In what concerns its scope, THE ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE HUMAN BODY metaphor focuses on the appropriateness of condition and on the structure (*Ibid.*, 158). One of the simple metaphors belonging to here is THE STRUCTURE OF AN ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN BODY, where one-to-one mappings between the source and the target domain are fairly visible – take, for instance, the expression *head of state*. Now, the body metaphor that runs through fragments 474 to 485 may correspond to the specific metaphor THE UNITY OF GOD AND PEOPLE IS THE HUMAN BODY.

A possible schematic representation of this metaphor can be the following (author's):

Available: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18269/18269-h/18269-h.htm

"Pour régler l'amour qu'on se doit à soi-même, il faut s'imaginer un corps plein de membres pensants car nous sommes membres du tout, et voir comment chaque membre doit s'aimer, etc." (fragment 474)

Figure 1: The Body Metaphor in 474-485

Parallel to the position of the heart in Pascal's philosophy in cognition, here it is God's will, the common soul that occupies the centre of the system – a reference to make to the already mentioned THE IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL metaphor. It is through the divine goodness that people, the thinking members are provided with the grâce efficace. In other words, God radiates his grace into the bodyparts, just like the heart pumps blood into the body. In fragment 475, Pascal expresses the necessity for the members to submit themselves to the will in order that the body function properly (emphasis by the author):

If the feet and the hands had a will of their own, they could only be in their order in **submitting this particular will to the primary will which governs the whole body**. Apart from that, they are in disorder and mischief; but in willing only the good of the body, they accomplish their own good.[7] (fragment 475)

Not much later, in fragment 480, Pascal explicitly states that individual happiness can only originate in our love for and submission to God:

To make the members happy, they must have one will, and submit it to the body.[8] (fragment 480)

Just as the members of the human body *move* simultaneously when ordered, people have to *act* according to the primary will; otherwise, unity cannot be ensured. Here, he metaphorical entailmentsWILL IS FORCE andACTION IS PHYSICAL MOVEMENTare not inherent to THE ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE HUMAN BODY metaphor only. They are universal metaphors, and, it is probably not without any conceptual backgrounding that the Latin word for 'will' is 'voluntas' (in French: *la volonté*), derived from the verb 'volō' which means, at the same time, 'to want, to desire', and to 'fly' (an observation made by Parker, 2013: 2). It appears, then, that human experience has associated will with force and physical movement from the very beginning.

Fragment 480 is not the only example, however, of will being metaphoricized as force. In fragment 477, Pascal, once again, lays down the prerequisite for the appropriate functioning of the system; what is more, he wraps out the metaphor, and, in the second part of the fragment, makes direct analogy between society (*la communauté civile*) and the body (*la communauté naturelle*):

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[7]Si les pieds et les mains avaient une volonté particulière,jamais ils ne seraient dans leur ordre qu'en soumettant cette volonté particulière à la volonté première qui gouverne le corps entier. Hors de là, ils sont dans le désordre et dans le malheur ; mais en ne voulant que le bien du corps, ils font leur propre bien. (fragment 475)

[8]Pour faire que les membres soient heureux, il faut qu'ils aient une volonté, et qu'ils la conforment au corps. (fragment 480)

[…]We must consider the general good; and the propensity to self is the beginning of all disorder, in war, in politics, in economy, and in the particular body of man […].If the members of natural and civil communities tend towards the weal of the body, the communities themselves ought to look to another more general body of which they are members. We ought therefore to look to the whole […].[9] (fragment 477)

Now, this fragment may be of particular relevance for three reasons. First, from a CMT point of view, it explicitly maps the scope of THE ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE HUMAN BODY metaphor, since it focuses on the appropriateness of condition ('the weal of the body'). Second, it shows how transition from one level of the Great Chain is possible: in this specific case, the metaphor uses the lower-level category of humans (their bodyparts, to be precise) to help conceptualize the higher-order category of society. Third, and, from our perspective, most important is that fragment 477 depicts a closed system, where movement is apparently bidirectional but is actually unidirectional. As noted above, God, from the central position, spreads the grâce efficace to the people selected for salvation. This act of God is not without any reciprocity, however; salvation being accorded upon, the individual automatically submits their will to God, moving towards the common soul, the heart of the system. By doing so, the individual gives up their autonomy to integrate into the whole body and maintain its balanced functioning – or, using Cartesian terms, to be a cog in the great mechanism. In fragment 483, Pascal declares this by writing:

To be a member is to have neither life, being, nor movement, except through the spirit of the body, and for the body. […]*Adhærens Deo unus spiritus est.*We love ourselves, because we are members of Jesus Christ. We love Jesus Christ, because He is the body of which we are members. All is one, one is in the other, like the Three Persons.[10](fragment 483)

He then concludes the total incorporation of the will into the individual and into God's community in fragment 485:

[…] we must love a being who is in us, and is not ourselves; and that is true of each and all men. Now, only the Universal Being is such. The kingdom of God is within us; the universal good is within us, is ourselves—and not ourselves.[11] (fragment 485)

Interestingly, this fragment gives place to another example of the permeability between the categories of the EGCB hierarchy: whereas, up to this point, the human body was used as a source domain to conceptualize a system, now it is a superior system, "the kingdom of God" that is used to view the divine microcosmos in the individual's soul by the grâce efficace. It becomes therefore evident that all levels of the chain can serve both as source and target domains, depending on the perspective taken.

For the appropriate functioning of a body, it is essential that the irredeemably sick or handicapped parts of it be removed – and, in Jansenism, there is no such thing as 'curable': the member is either healthy and thinking or sick and is subject to perdition. The body will, therefore, sever those parts that hinder the maintenance of its interior stability, its homeostasis. In practice, this means that those not provided with the divine grace will be destined for damnation, as represented on the visual a few pages earlier. This entailment of the metaphor is manifested in the mid-section of the already evoked fragment 483:

[…]The separate member, seeing no longer the body to which it belongs, has only a perishing and dying existence.

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[9] […] il faut tendre au général ; et la pente vers soi est le commencement de tout désordre, [en guerre,] en police, en économie, dans le corps particulier de l'homme […]Si les membres des communautés naturelles et civiles tendent au bien du corps, les communautés elles-mêmes doivent tendre à un autre corps plus général, dont elles sont membres. L'on doit donc tendre au général […]. (fragment 477)

[10]Être membre est n'avoir de vie, d'être et de mouvement que par l'esprit du corps et pour le corps. […]Adhaerens Deo unus spiritus est. On s'aime parce qu'on est membre de Jésus-Christ, parce qu'il est le corps dont on est membre. Tout est un, l'un est en l'autre, comme les trois Personnes. (fragment 483)

[11][…] il faut aimer un être qui soit en nous, et qui ne soit pas nous, et cela est vrai d'un chacun de tous les hommes. Or il n'y a que l'Être universel qui soit tel. Le royaume de Dieu est en nous : le bien universel est en nous, est nous-même, et n'est pas nous.

Yet it believes it is a whole, and seeing not the body on which it depends, it believes it depends only on self, and desires to make itself both centre and body. But not having in itself a principle of life, it only goes astray, and is astonished in the uncertainty of its being […][12] (fragment 483)

As shown in the analysis of the above fragments, this version of Pascal's for the metaphor THE ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE HUMAN BODYhas a conceptually and visually detailed structure, with the main mappings being the following:

target domain	source domain
God's unity with people (the divine system)	➔ the human body
the common soul	➔ the heart, the centre
the grâce efficace	➔ blood
people receiving the grâce efficace	➔ the thinking members
the rejected	➔ sick members
the appropriate functioning of the system	➔ stability, homeostasis

Figure 2: Main Mappings in Pascal's Metaphor

Fitting neatly into the EGCB system, this metaphor is successful in buttressing God's superiority over all other forms of existence in the hierarchy, thereby maintaning the established power relations in Judeo-Christian discourse. It must not be ignored, however, that Jansenist theology, with its particular view on the process of salvation, goes against the mainstream doctrines of the Church. This opposition is clearly expressed in Pascal's viewing the divine grace as the sole intermediary between God and his people, just as blood circulates from the heart into the veins and vica versa. In what regards the discursive function of the metaphor within *Pensées*, it can be concluded that it is very strong in reinforcing the persuasive power of Pascal's argumentation; coherent and free of contradictions, it contributes to the creation of a strong and apodictic manifesto of Port Royal Jansenism.

With reference to Pascal's conceptualization of the human body in cognition (section 3.1), it appears that Pascal was (intentionally or unconsciously) consequent in structuring the metaphor according to his thesis. The analogy between the heart's intermediary function and God's central position in the system is clearly visible: whereas in cognition it is the heart that transmits information between the body and the mind, in the divine system it is God whodisseminates the grâce efficace to people, harmonizing their physical will with that of the common soul. The consistency of this logic demonstrates that Pascal's system, despite all apparent contradictions, makes up a unified discourse with a solid foundation

4. Conclusions

The purpose of the present study was to analyze and interpret the body metaphor elaborated in fragments 474 to 485 in Pascal's *Pensées*,focusing primarily on its discursive function within the text itself and in the larger context of 17th century Jansenist and Catholic discourse. As to the latter, it can be concluded that the metaphor is in accordance with the ideology embedded in the Extended Great Chain of Being model in the sense that it places God on top of all other existing entities, reinforcing his superiority. As to the former, the analysis suggests that Pascal thoroughly exploits the THE ABSTRACT COMPLEX SYSTEM IS THE HUMAN BODY metaphor in order to establish a coherent discourse to his argumentation. Also, the logic in the structuration of the metaphor ties in with his philosophy on the importance of the human body in cognition, a view essentially opposing to Descartes' scepticism. However, to make far-reaching conclusions about Pascal's use of the body metaphor, it will be necessary to conduct an exhaustive analysis of all its occurences in Pascal's apologetic and philosophical work.

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[12] […]Le membre séparé, ne voyant plus le corps, auquel il appartient, n'a plus qu'un être périssant et mourant. Cependant il croit être un tout, et ne se voyant point de corps dont il dépende, il croit ne dépendre que de soi, et veut se faire centre et corps lui-même. Mais n'ayant point en soi de principe de vie, il ne fait que s'égarer, et s'étonne dans l'incertitude de son être […] (fragment 483)

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